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THE CASH BALANCE PLAN: AN INTEGRAL
COMPONENT OF THE DEFINED BENEFIT
PLAN RENAISSANCE
BARRY KOZAK*
The world of tax qualified retirement plans is comprised of
two types of plans: defined benefit plans and defined contribution
plans. For various reasons, the overall utility of the defined
benefit plan has diminished over the last three decades. However,
this article proposes that, due to some statutory changes and
economic trends over the last few years, the stage is set for a
revitalization of the use of defined benefit plans. An integral
component of this renaissance is the acceptance and proper use of
a hybrid plan design commonly referred to as a cash balance plan.
This article will first detail the key characteristics of defined
benefit and defined contribution plans, and will indicate which
characteristics were borrowed from each to form the hybrid cash
balance plan design. Although a hybrid, a cash balance plan is
universally viewed as a defined benefit plan; therefore, the second
part of this article will discuss the statutory requirements that all
defined benefit plans must comply with. Cash balance plans have
been the subject of litigation over the last few years; as such, the
third part of this article will detail the specific issues that have to
date been litigated. The fourth part will detail and summarize
how the courts have cumulatively decided the issues. The courts
are not the only parties that are looking at the cash balance plan
issues; hence, the fifth part of this article will summarize the
actions that have been taken in the various branches of
government. Finally, the sixth part of this article will describe the
defined benefit plan renaissance, will opine on how the cash
balance plan is an absolutely integral component, and will attempt
to show that individuals that oppose cash balance plans simply
misunderstand the reasons employers convert to or adopt cash
* Barry Kozak, an Attorney, Enrolled Actuary and Chartered Financial
Consultant, is the Associate Director of the graduate Employee Benefits
program at The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Ilinois, and is a legal
consultant at Chicago Consulting Actuaries, LLC. The author wishes to thank
Scott Miller, a recent joint J.D. and LL.M. (Employee Benefits) graduate from

The John Marshall Law School, for his research and assistance, and Jeffrey
W. Stevenson, a principal at Chicago Consulting Actuaries, LLC, for his
mentorship and general direction for this article.
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balance plans.
I.

WHAT IS A CASH BALANCE PLAN?

Unfortunately, there is no good statutory definition of a cash
balance plan.1 However, employers that sponsor them believe (or
at least hope) that they have a good tax-qualified retirement plan
through which they deliver retirement benefits to their employees.
Statutorily, there are only two classifications of qualified
retirement plans:2 a defined contribution plan and a defined
benefit plan. A cash balance plan is actually a hybrid, where
creative

attorneys,

actuaries,

accountants,

and

other benefits

professionals stole certain traits from each class of plan. A brief
discussion of defined contribution

and defined benefit plans is

needed before exploring the blended characteristics of a cash
balance plan.
A.

What is a Defined ContributionPlan?

The statutory definition of a defined contribution plan is "a
[pension] plan which provides for an individual account for each
participant and for benefits based solely on the amount
contributed to the participant's account, and any income,
expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other

participants

which

may

be

allocated

account. ' 3
There are several
contribution plans, such as:

*

to

different

such
types

participant's
of

defined

a money purchase plan,4 in which the plan document defines

1. As discussed later in this article, there is a statutory definition of
"certain plans" which, arguably, might encompass cash balance plans.
2. Retirement plans that comply with all of the requirements of Section
401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended and as codified in
Title 26 of the United States Code (hereafter referred to as "I.R.C."), and
including all regulations and other guidance published by the Department of
Treasury, are deemed "qualified" plans. With a qualified retirement plan, the
contributions made by the employer to fund the plan benefits are immediately
deductible, the income taxation for the participants is deferred until the year
that benefits are received from the plan, and neither the employer nor the
participants pay income taxes in between since the assets must generally be
invested in a special trust that meets the requirements of I.R.C. § 501(a)
(2000).
3. I.R.C. § 414(i) (2000). A basically identical definition is found in Section
3(34) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended
and as codified in Title 29 of the United States Code, at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et.
seq. (hereafter referred to as "ERISA"), and including all regulations and other
guidance published by the Department of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2000)
also labels such a plan as an "individual account plan."
4. Although there is no statutory definition, a money purchase plan is
considered a "pension plan" under the Treasury Regulations, since the plan is
established and maintained primarily to provide systematically for the
payment of definitely determinable benefits to its employees, and where such
contributions are fixed without being geared to profits. See Treas. Reg.
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the exact employer contribution that must be allocated to each
5
participant each year they are credited with a year of service;
6
" a profit sharingplan, in which the plan document defines the
exact method of allocating 7 the annual discretionary employer
contribution, if any, among the various participant accounts;
* an Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP"), which is a profit
sharing plan where the assets consist entirely of employer
stock;8
" a 401(k) plan,9 in which participants voluntarily elect to defer
a portion of their salaries into the plan, on a pre-tax basis, and
in which the employer may match a portion of the deferrals;
* a thrift plan, in which participants voluntarily elect to defer a
portion of their salary into the plan, on an after-tax basis; and
" a target benefit plan,10 which is a hybrid plan similar to a cash
balance plan, but which is actually classified as a defined
contribution plan.'1
In discussing the general class of defined contribution plans,
regardless of type, there are three main plan characteristics that
will become relevant in the subsequent discussion of a cash
balance plan. The first is the benefits that participants will be
entitled to. The second is the exposure to investment and market
risks. The third is the communication of plan benefits to the
participants (and their perceived understanding).
Regarding the benefits, as the statutory definition indicates,
every participant is entitled to her respective account, whatever it
is worth.
In all defined contribution plans, the employer
contribution made to the plan on an annual basis, if any, is
allocated among the participant accounts, as are forfeitures from
12
other participants who terminate without being fully vested.
§ 1.401-1(b)(1)(1) (2000).
5. A year of service is defined in I.R.C. § 411(a)(5) (2000) and 29 U.S.C.
§ 1052(a)(3)(A) as any predetermined twelve month period where the
participant has worked, or has been paid for, at least 1000 hours of service, as
that term is defined in 29 C.F.R. § 2530.200b-2 (2000).
6. A profit sharing plan is defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii) (2003).
7. Different allocation methods are allowed to be defined in the plan
document, as long as the allocations do not violate the nondiscrimination
requirements of I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (2000).

8. An ESOP must also meet the special requirements of I.R.C. § 401(a)(28)
(2000).
9. Cash or Deferred Arrangements are defined in I.R.C. § 401(k) (2000).
10. A target benefit plan was originally described by the IRS in Rev. Rul.
76-464, 1976-2 C.B. 115, but such Revenue Ruling was obsolete by Rev. Rul.
93-87, 1993-2 C.B. 124.
However, a safe harbor target benefit plan is
described in Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(b)(iii)(C)(3) (2003).
11. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 344 (1974).
12. Vesting of employer contributions, as defined in I.R.C. § 411(a)(2) (2000)
and 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2) (2000), means the portion of the benefit that the
participant has an unforfeitable right to receive, even if the individual's
employment is terminated.
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Fund earnings are also credited to the accounts (or debited if there
is a loss of market value). There are no guarantees on the
benefits, and the participants will only know what their respective
benefits are upon actual retirement or termination.
Regarding the exposure to investment risk, the participants
bear it all. In a defined contribution plan, either the employer
invests the plan assets, or investment discretion is turned over to
the plan participants themselves. Either way, the market risk is
totally borne by the participants.
Generally, the employer
designates at least one individual as a fiduciary, who will invest
the assets, and, as long as they are invested properly,13 the
fiduciary cannot be held personally liable 14 for any losses to the
accounts.
In many defined contribution plans, however, the
fiduciary transfers the actual day-to-day investment decisions
directly to the participants;. the fiduciary selects the investment
options, and if they are selected and administered properly, 15 then
the participants cannot hold the plan fiduciary liable for any losses
to their respective accounts. 16 Therefore, whether the employer
(through the plan fiduciary) invests the defined contribution plan
assets, or just selects the options available for the participants to
self-direct the investments of their individual accounts, if accounts
lose value right before a participant is set to retire, then that
participant either has less of a retirement nest egg than was
expected, or must choose to postpone retirement until a proper
nest egg is finally accumulated.
Regarding the communication of benefits, each year the
participant receives a reconciliation of her account from last year
to this year. It is apparent that participants easily understand the
current value of their benefits. However, as the benefits from the
plan are supposed to represent funds to be used during their
actual retirement, it is also quite apparent that the average
individual likely does not understand how a single sum of money
13. The fiduciary duties are defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000), and a

fiduciary must discharge his duties in the sole interest of the plan participants
and beneficiaries: exclusively; prudently; with the intent to diversify and
protect against large losses; and in accordance with the written plan document
and relevant laws.
14. A breach of fiduciary duty is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2000), and the
civil cause of action available against the fiduciary, as an individual, is
described in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).
15. The selection of and future. monitoring of the actual investment choices
available to the participants, including the use of employer stock, are all, in
and of themselves, fiduciary decisions subject to 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
16. Under 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c), and 29 C.F.R. § 2550-404c-1 (2003), all
investment options must provide the participants with an opportunity to
exercise control, such as the delivery of prospectus and the pass-through of
voting rights, and there must be at least three different investment
alternatives to choose from, which collectively represent a broad range of risk
and return characteristics.
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currently should be invested and annuitized over her future life
expectancy so that it will properly fund the retirement expenses.
B. What is a Defined Benefit Plan?
The statutory definition of a defined benefit plan is "any plan
which is not a defined contribution plan." 17 Obviously, Congress
was a little less clear in this definition, but certainly made it a
catch-all for any plan that does not fit neatly within the statutory
definition of a defined contribution plan. Some different rules
apply to defined benefit plans sponsored by single employers than
apply to defined benefit plans sponsored by multi-employers or
multiple employers. However, for the remainder of this article,
unless indicated otherwise, any reference to a defined benefit plan
will suggest a single employer sponsored defined benefit plan.
There are generally three types formulas that are drafted into
a traditional defined benefit plan document:
* A flat benefit formula, where salary is irrelevant and every
participant gets a stated monthly benefit multiplied by her
years of service with the employer;
" A fixed benefit formula,1 where every participant will get a
stated replacement percentage of her final average salary,
expressed as a monthly benefit; or
" A unit benefit formula,19 where every participant will earn a
stated replacement percentage of her salary for each year of
service with the employer, expressed as a monthly benefit.
Regarding the benefits, every participant is entitled to receive
whatever benefit is promised under the terms of the defined
benefit plan document. All defined benefit plans must provide a
retirement benefit expressed in the form of an annual benefit
commencing at normal retirement age. 20 The plan may provide
alternate forms of a distribution, such as a joint and survivor
annuity2' or a life annuity with a term certain, 22 and may even
17. I.R.C. § 414(i) (2000). A basically identical definition is found in Section
3(34) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended
and as codified in Title 29 of the United States Code, at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et.
seq. (hereafter referred to as "ERISA'), and including all regulations and other
guidance published by the Department of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2000)
also labels such a plan as an "individual account plan."
18. This design is sometimes referred to as a final average pay plan since
there is always a rolling average of salaries to which the formula is applied.
19. This design is sometimes referred to as a career average pay plan since
all salaries, even the lower salaries during an employee's earlier years, are
included in the overall benefit determination.
20. I.R.C. § 411(a)(7)(A)(i) (2003) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(23)(A) and
1054(b)(1)(C).
21. Unlike a life annuity which is paid as long a the participant is alive, a
joint and survivor annuity will be paid as long as the participant is alive, and
upon her death, if the named second life is still alive, then the annuity will be
paid until the death of the second life. In order to take advantage of this
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provide a single lump sum distribution; 23 however, the plan
document must state the actuarial equivalents used to convert the
life annuity into any other form of distribution in a manner that
prevents any type of discretion on the part of the plan
24
administrator.
Other features of defined benefit plans include the ability to
provide benefits based on employment with the employer before
the plan was actually established (referred to as a past service
liability), or service with a predecessor employer (such as service
with a different employer that ultimately gets merged into or is
acquired by the current employer sponsoring the plan). Defined
benefit plans can also offer early retirement subsidies and early
retirement windows that offer enhanced benefits in exchange for a
voluntary termination of employment. 25
Since defined
contribution plans are based on annual allocations rather than a
benefit promised at retirement, they cannot be designed to provide
these extra benefits 26 that are characteristic to defined benefit
plans.
Regarding the exposure to investment risk, the employer
bears it all. In a defined benefit plan, there is a pool of plan assets
rather than a collection of individual accounts. It is up to the
employer to properly fund the plan so that, each year, there are
always enough assets to pay out the liabilities (i.e., plan benefits).
Each year, an enrolled actuary27 is required to use reasonable
protection for the second life, the participant must pay a "premium" in the
form of a lesser monthly annuity. If the second life, which is irrevocably
selected before distributions begin, dies before the participant, then the
participant "loses" out on the premium paid.
22. In a similar manner, if the participant needs a certain term that the
annuity will be paid, regardless of whether she is alive, then a premium must
be paid in order to receive the protection of the desired term certain.
23. A lump sum distribution represents the actuarial present value that is
mathematically equivalent to the life annuity, based on the Plan's actuarial
equivalents (such as life expectancies and interest rates). The single lump
sum distribution may prove to be inadequate for a participant that actually
outlives her life expectancy. Therefore, the irrevocable election to receive a
lump sum distribution in lieu of any form of annuity is a gamble, and healthy
individuals that outlive their assumed life expectancies will "lose" out on any
future plan benefits once the lump sum distribution has been wholly depleted.
24. I.R.C. § 401(a)(25) (2002).
25. Oftentimes, when an employer is faced with the need to reduce its
workforce, the offering of early retirement incentives through a defined benefit
plan might encourage enough older employees to voluntarily leave so that
there is no need to fire anyone.
26. A single exception to this statement is that under I.R.C. § 414(v) (2002),
employees who are older than age fifty are allowed to make additional "[c]atch
up contributions" to make up for past years in which they might not have
taken full advantage of their annual deferral limits.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1241 (2000) established the Joint Board for the Enrollment
of Actuaries, and Regulations were published in 40 Fed. Reg. 18,776 (Apr. 30,
1975) which define the requirements for an individual to be certified as an
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assumptions 28 to estimate expected liabilities of the plan, compare
them to the current assets, and determine the minimum funding
requirement for the year. 29 The employer has little flexibility, and
unless the IRS approves a funding waiver, 30 the employer must
contribute whatever amount is determined by the enrolled
actuary. Therefore, in years that the assets lose value because of
poor investment performance, the contribution due to the plan will
be greater than expected.
Another aspect of defined benefits plans is the protection by
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC"),31 which
guarantees 32 the benefits promised to employees through defined
benefit plans. Almost all defined benefit plans need to pay
premiums into the PBGC, but only those plans in dire financial
straits will receive help from the PBGC. 33 This governmental
protection for all defined benefit plans makes them more
attractive to employees because even in a poorly funded plan, the
employees generally do not risk forfeited benefits due to poor
investment performance.
Finally, regarding the communication of benefits, the
participant usually receives a statement each year showing her
expected benefit that will be paid upon retirement (assuming that
she continues working for the rest of her career with the
employer), and the portion of the benefit that has been accrued to
date. 34 Arguably, the average participant in a defined benefit plan
might not understand or appreciate the true value of her benefits
until she approaches retirement age and the accrued benefit starts
enrolled actuary.
28. I.R.C. § 412(c)(3) (2000) and 29 U.S.C. § 1082(c)(3) (2000).
29. I.R.C. § 412(b) and 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b).
30. I.R.C. § 412(d).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000) established the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation, which is a federal corporation that insures the retirement
promises made by employers through defined benefit plans.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 1322 (2000) sets the statutory limits for such guarantees,
which are updated annually for cost of living adjustments.
33. There are three ways that a defined benefit plan is allowed to terminate
under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342 (2000): a standard termination, where the plan
has enough assets to pay out all current liabilities (and therefore will not
receive any financial assistance from the PBGC); a distress termination,
where the plan assets are insufficient, the economic viability of the sponsoring
employer is in doubt, and the employer asks the PBGC to assume trusteeship
of the assets; or a PBGC-initiated termination, where the PBGC assumes
trusteeship of a problematic plan regardless of whether the employer wants it
to or not. Most defined benefit plans are terminated under a standard
termination.
34. An employee is hired with no benefits in the plan, and if she continues
working until retirement, she will enjoy the full retirement benefits as
promised under the defined benefit plan document. Every defined benefit plan
document must describe how the benefit accrues along the way, and the
accrued benefit formula and pattern must comply with I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(A-C)
and 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(A-C) (2000).
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to approximate the full normal retirement benefit promised
through the plan.
C. What hybrid traits constitute a Cash Balance Plan?
Creative attorneys, actuaries, accountants, and other benefits
professionals found clients that liked the ability to offer a variety
of benefit promises and the single pool of assets found in a defined
benefit plan, but also liked the perceived portability and the
understanding of an individual account rather than a retirement
annuity. This led to some of the earliest cash balance plan
designs. 35 Generally, the defined contribution attributes of a cash
balance plan include: 36 the communication of an individual
account to each participant; accruals spread evenly over a
participant's career instead of mostly in the final years before
retirement (as in a traditional defined benefit plan); avoidance of
periods of service where accruals in the pension plan might be the
key factor an employee uses to choose between remaining
employed and terminating service with the employer; 37 and the
general availability of lump sum distributions. On the other hand,
the general defined benefit attributes of a cash balance plan
include: 38 the ability to provide early retirement subsidies, window
benefits, and other special purpose benefits; the ability to provide
benefits based on service with a predecessor employer or before the
plan was adopted; a limitation on the annual benefit at retirement
rather than a limit on the annual allocation to the account; the
PBGC guaranteed benefits; the employer bears the investment
risk rather than the individual participants and beneficiaries; and
existing traditional defined benefit plans can be converted into
cash balance plans instead of being terminated altogether.
As discussed below, the defined benefit traits of a cash
balance plan outweigh the defined contribution traits, and as such,
will be classified as a defined benefit plan. Therefore, the
sponsoring employer will be subject to greater administrative costs
(such as the required services of an enrolled actuary), will need to
properly fund the plan (even in lean years when plan contributions
might cause an economic strain), will generally need to pay
35. Bank of America is often credited as receiving one of the first IRS
determination letters in 1985, indicating that the IRS believed that the plan
document was in compliance with the qualified rules of I.R.C. § 401(a). See 1
Qual. Deferred Comp. Plans § 1.8, at n.1.
36. Stuart M. Lewis, Cash Balance Plans-Overview and Issues, American
Bar Association National Institute on ERISA Litigation, Nov. 11-13, 1999,
N99ELI ABA-LGLED H-1, at H-3.
37. This attribute of defined contribution plans, as well as the fact that
employees can take an immediate lump sum when they terminate
employment, lead many to view defined contribution plans as being more
portable than traditional defined benefit plans. Id.
38. Id.
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premiums to the PBGC, and will be restricted on when and how it
can potentially terminate the plan. In addition, as discussed
below, there are certain additional statutory requirements that all
defined benefit plans must meet in order to be qualified.
The colloquial term, cash balance plan, is misleading because
there are several distinctive designs that various employers have
adopted. A few of the more common designs include:
" A common cash balance plan, which provides definitely
determinable pension credits and interest credits into each
participant's hypothetical individual account for each year of
service; and the participant is entitled to the vested portion of
her hypothetical account as a benefit;
* A defined lump sum plan, where participants earn definitely
determinable credits for each year of service; the participant is
entitled to the sum of credits accumulated multiplied by final
average salary, expressed as a lump sum distribution, as a
benefit;
* A pension equity plan, which is similar to the defined lump
sum plan, but the definitely determinable credits are earned
based on age rather than by years of service; 39 and
* An indexed career plan, which provides an accrual for each
year equal to a specified percentage of that year's salary, and
instead of interest credits, provides definitely determinable
index rate conversion factors that improve each year's
40
cumulative accruals to the following year.

II. WHAT STATUTORY RULES MUST A CASH BALANCE
DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN COMPLY WITH?
Most of the statutory, rules under I.R.C. § 401(a) are
applicable to all qualified retirement plans, but there are certain
rules that specifically affect defined benefit plans. It is been
widely accepted that the cash balance plan design represents a
hybrid defined benefit plan, and, must therefore comply with these
additional rules. However, the reasons for such acquiescence need
to be explored, since Congress has never classified cash balance
plans in the statute, the Department of Treasury indicated their
classification of cash balance plans as defined benefit plans
through guidance unrelated to the interpretation of the statutory
definitions, and the appellate courts that have made such a
conclusion generally include no legal basis. The author does not
believe that a cash balance plan is improperly classified as a
39. Pamela C. Scott, Qualified Defined Benefit Plans: The Essentials,

Practicing Law Institute Tax Law and Estate Planning Course Handbook
Series, July, 1998, 421 PLI/Tax-33, at 40.
40. Strella, 352-3rd T.M., Specialized Qualified Plans-Cash Balance,
Target, Age- Weighted and Hybrids, at V.A. § 2.available at
http://www.bnatax.com/tm/authorss.htm.
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defined benefit plan, but feels compelled to lay out the inconclusive
basis upon which this determination has been made.
A. Is a cash balanceplan truly a defined benefit plan?
A cash balance plan has no statutory definition. As indicated
previously, there are only two statutory definitions of the class of
qualified retirement plans: defined contribution and defined
benefit plans. 41
Congress has, however, included a quasidefinition/quasi-requirement in the statute, which is simply
labeled "certain plans."4 2 Under this definition/requirement, a
defined benefit plan which provides a benefit derived from
employer contributions which is based partly43 on the balance of
the separate account of a participant shall be treated as a defined
contribution plan for purposes of the minimum participation
standards, 44 shall be treated as a defined benefit plan for purposes
of an excise tax on prohibited transactions, 45 and then shall be
viewed as a bifurcated plan consisting of a defined contribution
portion, where the defined contribution rules apply to certain
aspects of the plan design to the extent the benefits are based on the
separate account of the participant,and a defined benefit portion,
with respect to the remaining portion of the benefits. 46 A § 414(k)
plan is generally thought of as a single plan that provides both
traditional defined benefit and defined contribution promises
through a floor-offset arrangement, 47 and does not accurately
41. See supra note 3 and 17, respectively.
42. See I.R.C. § 414(k) and 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (35)(A) and (B) (providing
basically similar definitions, however, the provision in the Code has more
cross-references than the provision in ERISA, and the term "certain plan" is
not contained in the ERISA provision).
43. Id. (emphasis added).

44. I.R.C. § 414(k)(1), referencing I.R.C. § 410, and 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000).
45. I.R.C. § 414(k)(3).
There is a similar definition of Prohibited
Transaction in 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (2000), but this ERISA provision is not crossreferenced anywhere within 29 U.S.C. § 1052. The definitions of Prohibited
Transaction are basically identical, except that under the ERISA definition,
the term "party in interest" (which includes certain relatives of individuals
deemed parties in interest) replaces the term "disqualified person" (which does
not include those relatives). The definition/requirement provision at § 414(k)
of the Code, which indicates how the Department of Treasury will treat the
plan for tax purposes, arguably does not affect whether a similarly designed
retirement plan will be deemed a defined benefit or a defined contribution
plan or how it will be treated by the Department of Labor and the courts for
civil and criminal enforcement purposes of ERISA-defined prohibited
transaction violations.
46. I.R.C. § 414(k)(2) and 29 U.S.C. § 1052(B) (emphasis added). The only
common provision that is similarly referenced in both the Code and ERISA is
the definition of accrued benefit, which, as referenced by I.R.C. § 414(k)(2), is
limited to I.R.C. § 411(a)(7)(A), but as referenced in 29 U.S.C. § 1052(B),
applies more generally to 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(23) and 1054 (2000).
47. See Berger v. Nazametz, 157 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1002 (S.D. Ill. 2001)
(explaining a typical floor-offset arrangement where a participant always
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describe any of the known cash balance plan designs (which are
based wholly, instead of partly, on individual accounts).
If I.R.C. § 414(k), and its corresponding provision in ERISA
§ 3(35)(A) and (B), does not encompass the true characteristics of a
cash balance plan, then one of the two actual statutory definitions
(defined contribution plans and defined benefit plans) must be
complied with. Most will acquiesce that a cash balance plan does
not fit completely within the definition of a defined contribution
plan, since the interest is generally guaranteed, so it must, by
default, fit within the catch-all definition of a defined benefit plan.
This is the position that has been taken by the Department of
Treasury. 48 Again, the author does not in any way disagree that a
cash balance plan should be classified as a defined benefit plan
rather than a defined contribution plan; however, the author
wants to point out that Congress has never affirmatively
promulgated this result, and that Treasury, instead of providing
their interpretation through regulations published specifically on
any of the definitions contained in I.R.C. § 414, only provided their
interpretation through regulations discussing how defined benefit
plans can use cross-testing methods to comply with the
nondiscrimination rules 49 and through guidance discussing how
defined benefit plans need to determine the present value of lump
sum distributions. 50
The Department of Labor, as the other
federal agency authorized to regulate ERISA plans,51 has not
addressed how cash balance plans should be classified through any
official guidance. 52 Finally, as far as a judicial decree, only a few
appellate courts have held that cash balance plans are indeed
defined benefit plans,5 3 and there remains a chance that defendant
receives at least the defined. benefit promise, paid partly from the defined
benefit trust and partly from the defined contribution trust; however, the
participant might receive a higher benefit if the contributions and earnings
attributable to the profit sharing account produce an enhanced benefit). In
Berger, the employer previously maintained a separate defined benefit plan
and a defined contribution plan, but then terminated the defined contribution
plan and transferred those plan assets into the defined benefit trust, thus
creating a plan described at I.R.C. § 414(k) and 29 U.S.C. § 1052(A) and (B).
48. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(c)(3)(i) (2002) (defining a safe harbor
testing method for cash balance plans); I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359
(defining a cash balance plan and labeling it as a defined benefit plan).
49. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (2000).
50. Id. at § 417(e) (2000).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1204 as further coordinated through various Executive
Orders.
52. Upon visiting the website for the Department of Labor's Employee
Benefits Security Administration, at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa, informal
guidance such as "Frequently Asked Questions about Cash Balance Plans"
clearly indicate that cash balance plans should be classified as defined benefit
plans, but the author could not find more official guidance published by the
DOL that provides support for this presumption.
53. See Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 159 n.6 (2d Cir. 2000) (using
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plans in other circuits could potentially argue that they are
defined contribution plans, similar to money purchase pension
plans or target benefit pension plans, rather than defined benefit
plans.
The author believes that a main motivating factor for
employer sponsors of cash balance plans to want to categorize
them as defined benefit plans is because they want to avoid any
tax penalties when converting from a traditional defined benefit
plan into a cash balance plan. 54 Additionally, many of the
conversions in the 1980's and 1990's allowed employers to use up
some of the surplus by providing enhanced benefits to some
participants, and due to the accounting rules that determine how
defined benefit plan obligations are shown on the corporate income
statement, 55 many employers enjoyed an improved earnings-pershare after the conversion only because the cash balance design
was assumed to be a defined benefit plan. Therefore, while it is
universally accepted that cash balance plans are classified as
defined benefit plans rather than defined contribution plans, there
is apparently no specific statutory basis, and the guidance from
the Departments of Treasury and Labor, aggregated with the
opinions of three Courts of Appeal, while not necessarily incorrect,
do not seem to include formal and uncontroverted legal analyses in
support of their respective conclusions.
B. What tax qualified rules apply only to defined benefit plans?
Assuming for the remainder of this article that cash balance
plans are properly classified as defined benefit plans, then in
the catch-all definition of a defined benefit plan as support for its conclusion,
and where the defendant Plan does not dispute such definition); Lyons v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. Salaried Employees Ret. Plan, 221 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th
Cir. 2000) (making the statement without any cited support); Berger v. Xerox
Corp. Ret. Income Guar. Plan, 338 F.3d 755, 757 (7th Cir. 2003) (making the
statement without any cited support).
54. Under I.R.C. § 4980 (2002), if a defined benefit plan is terminated and
any portion of the assets revert back to the employer in accordance with the
plan document, then such reversion is subject to a 20% penalty tax if the
replacement defined contribution plan satisfies the qualified replacement plan
rules of § 4980(d)(2), otherwise, under § 4980(d)(1), reversions are subject to a
50% penalty tax. A defined benefit plan that is amended into another form of
a defined benefit plan is not subject to such penalties. Therefore, plan
sponsors are in a better position if the conversion from a traditional defined
benefit plan into a cash balance plan design is considered merely an
amendment into another form of defined benefit plan rather than as a
termination of a defined benefit plan and the establishment of a replacement.
However, in the conversions that are known to have occurred, 100% of the
assets were transferred to the replacement plans and the employers received
no reversions at all; thus, even if a cash balance plan is someday deemed a
defined contribution plan rather than a defined benefit plan, there is no
reversion that is subject to any penalty tax.
55. See infra Section II.B.19.
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addition to the laundry list of requirements 56 that are applicable to
all qualified plans, there are certain specific requirements that
apply only to defined benefit plans. The following list represents
some of the issues that an employer must be prepared to deal with
if it establishes a cash balance plan (or must continue to deal with
if it converts a traditional defined benefit plan into a cash balance
plan). Although these required thresholds and limitations are not
shown in any specific order of importance, the first five represent
issues which have to date been litigated in cash balance plan
programs, which will be discussed in further detail later in this
article, and the remaining provisions represent potential issues
that cash balance plan sponsors must be prepared to defend if
litigated by participants or if challenged by the Departments of
Treasury or Labor.
1. No participant's accrued benefit can be reduced on account of
any increase in his age or service57
2. No participant's benefit accrual can be ceased, nor can the rate
of an employee's benefit accrual be reduced, because of the
58
attainment of any age.
3. The optional form of benefit, when expressed as a lump sum
distribution, shall not be less than the present value of
benefits calculated by using the applicable mortality table and
applicable interest rate 59 if the plan allows for a lump sum
distribution.
4. A participant's accrued benefit cannot be decreased by an
60
amendment of the plan.
5. Benefits must accrue in accordance to one of three accrued
benefit methods (the 3-percent method, the 133 1/3 percent
61
rule, or the Fractional rule).
6. If the plan is amended to provide a significant reduction in the
rate of future benefit accrual, then in order for the amendment
to be effective, the plan administrator must provide a notice to
56. All plans must comply with the applicable provisions of I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(1) through (34) (2002) to be tax-qualified. See supra note 2.
57. I.R.C. § 401(a)(7) (referencing I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(G), and 29 U.S.C.
§ 1054(b)(1)(G)).
58. I.R.C. § 401(a)(7) (referencing I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(H), and 29 U.S.C.
§ 1054(b)(1)(H)). Note that the ERISA provision uses the term "employee"
instead of "participant" in the first clause about benefit accrual.
59. I.R.C. § 401(a)(11) (referencing I.R.C. § 417(e)). This is sometimes
referred to as either the "GATT rate" or the "RPA rate," referencing the Act
that added this provision to the Code: the Retirement Protection Act of 1994
("RPA"), signed into law by President Clinton on December 8, 1994 as part of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT'") legislation, P.L. 103465.
60. I.R.C. § 401(a)(7) (referencing I.R.C. § 411(d)(6), and 29 U.S.C.
§ 1054(g)(1)).
61. Id. (referencing I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(A), (B), and (C), and 29 U.S.C. § 1054
(b)(1)(A), (B), and (C)).
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each applicable individual describing the reduction. 62
If the participant dies before the annuity starting date and has
a surviving spouse, then a qualified pre-retirement joint and
survivor annuity shall be provided to the participant's
surviving spouse; otherwise, if a participant is married on her
annuity starting date, then the accrued benefit payable to the
participant shall be provided in the form of a qualified joint
and survivor annuity unless the spouse agrees, in writing, to
waive all ERISA spousal rights, and to receive an optional
63
form of benefit payment (such as a lump sum distribution).
The annual benefit paid cannot be greater than $160,000 (as
adjusted) or, if less, 100% of the participant's average
64
compensation.
For each year that the plan is top-heavy, each participant who
is a non-key employee must receive a minimum accrued
benefit of at least 2% of his average compensation for high five
65
years for each year of service (to a maximum of ten years).
Required distributions for employees who have attained age 70
1/2 must comply with the defined benefit plan minimum
66
distribution rules.
In order to provide definitely determinable benefits, whenever
the amount of any benefit is to be determined on the basis of
actuarial assumptions, such assumptions must be specified in
67
the plan in such a way that precludes employer discretion.
On each day of the plan year, the plan must benefit at least
fifty employees or, if less, 40% of all employees of the
68
employer.
If the plan is terminated and there are excess assets after all
liabilities have been paid, then the employer will pay a 50%
penalty tax on the amount reverted. 69 Additionally, if the plan
is voluntarily terminated, it must comply with the standard

62. I.R.C. § 4980F(2002); 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (h).
63. I.R.C. § 401(a)(11) (referencing I.R.C. § 417, and 29 U.S.C. § 1055). In
addition to the benefits themselves, certain notices describing these spousal
rights are required to be delivered at various times.
64. I.R.C. § 401(a)(16) (referencing I.R.C. § 415(b)). Note that a participant
must be credited with ten years of service in order to be entitled to the full
annual benefit limitation.
65. I.R.C. § 401(a)(10)(B) (referencing I.R.C. § 416).
66. I.R.C. § 401(a)(9). Regulations describing the method for calculating
the required minimum distributions from defined contribution plans have
been published in final form, in Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1 through -5, and -7
through -9. However, the regulations describing the method for calculating
the required minimum distributions from defined benefit plans have only been
published in temporary form, in Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-6T.
67. I.R.C. § 401(a)(25) (2002).
68. Id. § 401(a)(26).
There is controversy over whether, as the IRS
interprets this statutory provision, each individual needs "meaningful
benefits" in the defined benefit plan to be counted in the number account.
69. I.R.C. § 4980 (2002).
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termination rules. 70
14. The lump sum distributions payable to the top twenty five
paid employees might be restricted depending on the plan's
71
funded status.
15. Other than through a qualified plan loan, 72 no in-service
distributions are allowed 73 while participants are still active
employees with the sponsoring employer.
16. All defined benefit plans are subject to the minimum funding
rules, 74 where an enrolled actuary is required to perform an
actuarial valuation on an annual basis 75 in order to determine

the proper funding based on the current value of plan assets
and the expected level and timing of plan liabilities. The
minimum required contribution is due on a quarterly basis,

76

may include an additional contribution if the employer is
large, 77 and is based on a chosen funding method that can only
78
periodically be changed.
17. Most defined benefit plans must pay premiums on an annual
basis to fund the PBGC, 79 and the premiums are calculated
based on a standard dollar amount per participant plus a
variable dollar amount (based on the funded status of the
80
plan) per participant.
18. For those defined benefit plans subject to PBGC governance,
certain reportable events81 must be disclosed to the PBGC so
that potentially troubled plans are at least on the PBGC's
short list of plans that they need to monitor.
19. Although not required by the Code or ERISA, defined benefit
plans maintained by publicly held corporations must show on
their income statements a pension expense that can
potentially affect the overall earnings-per-share of the
82
corporate sponsor.
70. See supra note 33.
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-5(b).
72. I.R.C. § 7 2 (p) (2002).
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) indicates that in-service distributions are
allowed from profit sharing plans, but not from defined benefit or other
pension plans.
74. I.R.C. § 412(b) (2002); 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b).
75. I.R.C. § 412(c)(9); 29 U.S.C. § 1082(c)(9).
76. I.R.C. § 412(m); 29 U.S.C. § 1082(e).
77. I.R.C. § 412(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1082(d). A plan is large if there are more
than one-hundred participants.
78. I.R.C. § 412(c)(5)(A) and 29 U.S.C. § 1082(c)(5)(A).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 1321, which covers almost all defined benefit plans, but
with exceptions under paragraph (b) for certain plans, such as those only
covering substantial owners or for plans maintained by professional service
employers with less than twenty-five employees at all times after September
2, 1974.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 1306.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 1343.
82. Requirements of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, Standards
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C. How do benefits accrue in a Cash Balance Plan?
As previously discussed, there are several cash balance plan
designs. For the remainder of this article, unless otherwise
indicated, a reference to a cash balance plan will suggest a
"common" cash balance plan design. In a common cash balance
plan, there is generally a formula in the document that provides
pension credit allocations (such as ten percent of pay) and interest
credit allocations (such as the GATT § 417(e) rate in effect in the
December of the prior plan year) into each individual's
hypothetical account for each year of credited service. If viewed on
a graph, the accruals are essentially level throughout the
employee's career (although they might increase somewhat in later
years as the salaries are generally highest in the final years before
retirement). This differs from the accrual patterns of traditional
defined benefit plans, where, if viewed on a graph, the least
valuable accruals are generally earned in the early years and the
most valuable accruals are generally earned in the final years
before retirement. Therefore, all other things being equal, a
traditional defined benefit plan is designed to provide the most
valuable benefits to older and longer-serviced employees. Cash
balance plans, on the other hand, are not necessarily designed to
favor any group of employees. As will be discussed later in the
article, however, there is the economic reality that since a younger
employee's expected career span is longer than an older employee's
expected span, then the result of the compounding of interest over
a longer period of time tends to make identical cash balance plan
credits more valuable to younger and lesser-serviced employees
than they are to older employees.
The other major difference between the accrual patterns in a
traditional defined benefit plan and in a cash balance plan is the
effect of applying an accrual formula to average salaries as
opposed to applying the formula to each year's respective salary.
In many traditional defined benefit plans, the replacement
formula stated in the plan document is applied to a rolling average
salary, and, since most employees receive continual compensation
raises, the benefit increases proportionally as the salaries
increase. For example, if a defined benefit plan promises an
employee 70% of her high three year average salary upon
retirement, and assuming that Employee A is fully vested and
accrued in her benefit, then at age sixty, when her high three year
average salary is $100,000, she will receive a retirement annuity
of $70,000 per year upon retirement (age sixty-five) for the rest of
her life; but at age sixty-three, when her salaries have increased
each year and her high three year average is now $120,000, then
her annual benefit starting at age sixty-five will have jumped to
Number 87 and Number 88.
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$84,000. This increase in accrued benefit is due solely to her
increased average salary.
In most cash balance plans, however, pension credits are
accrued on a year-by-year basis, so the credits earned in the
earlier years when salaries are traditionally lower will be locked
in, and will not roll up as the employee's salaries increase over the
rest of her career. For example, if a cash balance plan promises an
employee an annual allocation of 10% of her salary, then if
Employee A's salary for 2003 is $100,000, she will receive an
allocation for 2003 of $10,000. If her salary increases in 2004 to
So,
$120,000, then her allocation for 2004 will be $12,000.
although the cash balance allocations will increase each year as
salaries increase, the earlier allocations will not be increased to
reflect later salaries.
III. WHAT IS THE BIG CONTROVERSY OVER CASH BALANCE PLANS?

Although there are some issues with the general design of
cash balance plans and whether they comply with the statutory
provisions that apply specifically to defined benefit plans, most of
the outrage, and in this author's opinion, misunderstanding, has
centered around the conversion from a traditional defined benefit
plan into a cash balance plan. "One of the hottest issues in the
pension world today involves companies replacing their traditional
pension plans with so-called cash balance plans."8 3 When a
traditional defined benefit plan is converted into a cash balance
plan, the sponsoring employer must determine how the opening
hypothetical cash balance accounts will be valued.8 4 Cash balance
plans are oftentimes viewed as being more beneficial to younger
and lesser-serviced employees, so even if each participant's
account balance on the first day after the conversion is equal to
the present value of accrued benefits on the day before the
conversion, there is a high probability that the level of benefits
promised to an older and longer-serviced employee under the old
plan design cannot be accumulated under the cash balance design
with only a few years of allocations left until retirement.
Therefore, the older and longer-serviced participants will generally
lose out on some of the previously-promised benefits from the
traditional plan that will not be available after the conversion into
a cash balance plan.85 Even if the employer tries to mitigate the
loss of promised benefits to some of the older workers, unless it
ensures that every single participant will not lose any promised
83. Jonathan Barry Forman & Amy Nixon, Cash Balance Pension Plan
Conversions, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379, 380 (2000).
84. See generally id. (providing a complete discussion of conversions).
85. Accrued benefits can never be reduced due to a plan amendment, but
promised benefits that have not yet been accrued can be reduced or
eliminated. I.R.C. § 401(a)(7) (2002).
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benefits under the new plan design, then there is always going to
be a potential cut-off point where some older participants are not
wholly protected. It is this group of employees caught in the
middle that is the likely class of plaintiffs.
If the traditional defined benefit plan is terminated, then the
plan pays out all accrued liabilities, and all future promised
benefits are totally eliminated for all participants.
If that
employer establishes a brand new qualified retirement plan, then
the new promised benefits are not affected by the accrued benefits
from the now-terminated traditional defined benefit plan. The
problem with conversions, rather than terminations, is that all of
the accrued benefit rules for defined benefit plans will carry over
into the new cash balance design, which then reasonably suggests
that the future, not-yet-accrued benefits from the traditional
defined benefit plan before the conversion, can affect the future
benefit promises under the newly converted cash balance plan
design.
There are several methods that can be used by employers to
provide a smooth transition into the cash balance design, such
as:8 6 grandfathering the traditional defined benefit formula for
certain older, longer-serviced participants; providing a one-time
choice between the old and new formulas to certain grandfathered
participants; providing an annual choice between the old and new
formulas to certain grandfathered participants; providing the
greater of the old or the new formula to certain grandfathered
participants; providing the frozen benefits from the traditional
plan (increased by salaries earned after the conversion) plus the
cash balance benefits; providing greater cash balance plan credits
to certain grandfathered participants; providing early retirement
subsidies through the cash balance design that are lost after the
conversion; or providing greater opening account balances for
certain grandfathered participants that the cash balance plan
would otherwise establish. To summarize, there are many options
that are available to employers who wish to mitigate the effect of a
cash balance plan conversion on certain older and longer-serviced
participants. Such mitigation might reduce the possibility that an
irate participant will sue the plan sponsor to recover future
promised benefits that are lost in the conversion, and might be
good public relations for the sponsoring employer. However, under
the current statutory and regulatory framework, there is nothing
that mandates any type of mitigation.
The following nine issues represent the controversies in cash
86. John Wendelin & Steve Pujol, Cash Balance Pension Plans: Employer
"Transition Benefit" Practices, handout materials for the American Bar
Association Joint Committee on Employee Benefits teleconference, "The Beat
Goes On: New Cash Balance Cases That May Rock Things," (Aug. 26, 2003),
available at http://www.abanet.org/jceb/2003/t030826.html.
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balance plan conversions that have been litigated thus far. The
classes of plaintiffs have generally been the "caught-in-the-middle"
group.
A.

Wear-away

As discussed, under ERISA § 204(g) and I.R.C. § 411(d)(6), no
participant's accrued benefit can ever be reduced due to a plan
amendment.8 7 This restriction applies to the conversion of a
traditional defined benefit plan into a cash balance plan. If the
employer does not mitigate the effect of lost future promised
benefits, then the simple rule is that the participant's hypothetical
cash balance account can never be less than the present value of
previously accrued benefits on the day before the conversion. The
wear-away problem occurs when the method for determining the
opening account balances for all participants produces opening
accounts for some of the older workers that are less than their
present values of previously accrued benefits. Such accounts will
grow with annual cash balance and interest credits, but can never
be less than the respective present value of previously accrued
benefits. Therefore, it may take several years under the new cash
balance formula for a participant's cash balance account to exceed
the preserved present value. It is only at that point in time that
such a participant will reap any benefits from the cash balance
conversion. In other words, it may take several years for the
preserved present value to "wear away."
To illustrate this point, assume an employer maintains a
traditional defined benefit plan, which promises 1% of
compensation for each year of service. Assume that Employee B,
age sixty, has twenty years of service on December 31, 2002, when
the plan is converted into a cash balance design, and assume
further that the present value of his accrued benefit, based on the
actuarial assumptions stated in the plan document, including a 5%
interest rate, is $150,000. Assume that the cash balance plan will
provide an allocation of 10% of salary plus 5% interest credits, and
the method of determining opening cash balance accounts,
whatever it is, produces an opening balance of $130,000 for
Employee B.
Employee B's benefits from the plan, when
communicated as a lump sum, must always be at least $150,000,
improved with interest. Therefore, on January 1, 2003, he is
entitled to the greater of (i) $150,000 or (ii) $130,000. Assume that
Employee B's salary is $100,000 for 2003. On December 31, 2003,
he is entitled to the greater of (i) $150,000 * 1.05 (which is
$157,500) or (ii) $130,000 * 1.05 + $10,000 (which is $146,500).
Assume that Employee B's salary is $110,000 for 2004.
On
December 31, 2004, he is entitled to the greater of (i) $157,500 *
87. See supra note 60.
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1.05 (which is $165,375) or (ii) $146,500 * 1.05 + $11,000 (which is
$164,825). Assume that Employee B's salary is $115,000 for 2005.
On December 31, 2005, he is entitled to the greater of (i) $165,375
* 1.05 (which is $173,644) or (ii) $164,825 * 1.05 + $11,500 (which
is $184,566). Therefore, in this example, it would take Employee
B three years until he actually accrues a benefit in the cash
balance plan design, after the conversion, that will increase his
preserved accrued benefits from the traditional defined benefit
plan on the day before the conversion; however, note that in this
example, Employee B would be sixty-three years old, and would
have earned no benefit accruals between ages sixty and sixtythree, and even though his account from the cash balance plan
design at age sixty-five will be more than his lump sum would
have been at his age sixty-five if the Plan had merely been
terminated on December 31, 2002, it will still be less than his
lump sum would have been at his age sixty-five if the Plan had not
been converted from the traditional defined benefit design.
The issue is whether cash balance plan conversions
improperly reduce accrued benefits. See Sections IV.A.1 and
IV.E.1 below.
B. Interest credits and the Whipsaw problem
While a participant is still employed, she is credited with cash
balance credits and interest credits. However, there is a question
as to whether the future interest credits constitute part of the
accrued benefit. In other words, if a participant in a cash balance
plan terminates employment at age fifty, then are the interest
credits that would be added to her account over the next fifteen
years (until normal retirement at age sixty-five) part of her
accrued benefit, even if the participant takes a complete lump sum
distribution at age fifty. One of the requirements of a distribution
that is paid in a form other than as a life annuity, is that no
portion of the accrued benefit may be forfeited.8 8 Although many
employers concede that future interest credits do constitute part of
the accrued benefit that can never be reduced or taken away, there
is still no affirmative statutory provision that requires it, and is
only discussed in non-regulations guidance.8 9
Also at issue is the calculation of the lump sum payable to a
participant that so elects to receive a lump sum. In a traditional
defined benefit plan, the document will express the promised
retirement benefits in the form of an annuity starting at normal
retirement age, and might provide a lump sum as an optional form
of distribution. If a defined benefit plan offers a lump sum option,
then the GATT § 417(e) rates must be used to calculate the
88. I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359.
89. Id.
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minimum lump sum that must be distributed at any point in
time, 90 regardless of the plan's actuarial assumptions. Congress
added the qualified joint and survivor annuity provisions,
including this minimum lump sum distribution amount, in order
to make it easier for working women to participate in pension
plans, and to permit surviving spouses to share in participating
workers' retirement benefits. 91 Additionally, under ERISA §
203(a) and I.R.C. § 411(a)(2), the calculation of lump sum
distributions and, likely, the opening account balances
immediately following the conversion, cannot cause accrued
benefits to be forfeited.
In a cash balance plan, however, interest credits are part of
the benefit itself, not just a way to express mathematically
equivalent benefit values at different points of time. The IRS
issued a guidance 92 that indicated that cash balance plans, as
defined benefit plans, must also comply with the discounting rules
of I.R.C. § 417(e). The problem is that if the sponsoring employer
wants to provide interest credits until normal retirement with a
guaranteed rate that is greater than the GATT § 417(e) applicable
interest rate, and then discount to current age using the currently
low GATT rates, then the minimum lump sum distribution that
actually must be paid will be greater than the account balance.
For example, if the employer wants to be benevolent and
guarantee an 8% interest credit rate on the cash balance account,
but if, according the IRS, the plan is required to discount the
distributions using a lower GATT interest rate, such as 5.48% for
2002, then the distribution will be greater than the hypothetical
cash balance account since, mathematically, a lower discount rate
will yield a higher present value. Assume Employee C is sixtyfour years old, and has a cash balance account of $100,000. If
Employee C terminates employment and elects to receive a lump
sum, then, under the IRS rules, the account balance must be
projected to her age sixty-five at the Plan's interest crediting rate
of 8% (i.e., $100,000 * 1.08 (which is $108,000)), but then
discounted at the current GATT § 417(e) rate of 5.48% (i.e.,
$108,000 / 1.0548 (which is $102,389)). Therefore, in this case, if
Employee C elected a lump sum distribution at age sixty-four, the
Plan would be required to pay her $102,389, even though the
account based on the cash balance formula is only $100,000.
90. Id. The applicable federal rates under I.R.C. § 417(e) are updated and
published monthly. Many defined benefit plans, however, include procedures
that set the GATT § 417(e) rate in effect in the month preceding the current
plan year as the single rate that will be used to determine the minimum
present values of accrued benefits for all lump sums that are distributed
during the current plan year. Id.
91. David J. Guin, The Retirement Equity Act of 1984: One Step Forward,
Two Steps Back, 37 ALA. L REV. 163, 172 (1985).
92. I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359.
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This means that terminated participants taking lump sums
will each receive more than their hypothetical cash balance
accounts; thus, there will be an actuarial loss in the plan, which
will require greater contributions from the employer to keep the
plan properly funded for the remaining participants, who, will
likely cause further actuarial losses when they terminate
employment and receive their respected lump sum distributions.
This phenomenon is referred to as whipsaw. Therefore, in order to
avoid this whipsaw problem, employers are forced to credit
interest using the lower guaranteed GATT rate rather than a
higher rate. This practice avoids actuarial losses in the plan, but
hurts participants who would have received greater interest
credits if the cash balance plan did not need to comply with the
minimum survivor annuity rules. In the above example, if the cash
balance plan document indicated that interest would be credited at
the current prevailing GATT § 417(e) rate rather than a locked-in
rate of 8%, then Employee C's account would be improved and
discounted at the same interest rate, resulting in a distribution
equal to her hypothetical account balance of $100,000.
The issue is whether the determination of a lump sum
distribution must be the present value of the normal retirement
benefits (expressed as an annuity). See sections IV.B.1, IV.C.1,
IV.D.3, and IV.F.1 below.
C. Age discrimination- under ERISA
As previously discussed, 93 there are two provisions that
prohibit age discrimination in a defined benefit plan's accrued
benefits. However, these two separate provisions use two different
terms, and the question is whether these terms "accrued benefit"
and "rate of benefit accrual" mean the same thing. One argument
is that they mean the same thing because, in order to calculate the
rate of benefit accrual, the current year's accrued benefit must be
compared to last year's accrued benefit. The other argument,
however, is that since Congress chose to use two different terms in
consecutive statutory provisions, then the terms intentionally have
different definitions, and proving that the rate of accrual does not
decrease because of age is independent of proving that accrued
benefits do not decrease because of age. This latter argument is
bolstered by two points: (1) the fact that there is a statutory
definition of "accrued benefit" which is either expressed in the
form of an annual benefit commencing at normal retirement age 94

93. See supra sections II.B.1 and
94. I.R.C. § 411(a)(7)(A) (2002).
"accrued benefit" for all purposes
exception to the general definition
204(b)(1)(C). Id.

2 above.
This section of the Code defines the term
of I.R.C. § 411, with a reference to an
at § 411(c)(3), and ERISA §§ 3(23)(A) and
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or is expressed as an actuarial equivalent of such amount, 95 but
there is no statutory definition of "rate of benefit accruals;" and (2)
96
the headings that contain the respective provisions are different
and that the provision for "rate of benefit accruals" ostensibly only
applies to participants who are still employed beyond normal
retirement age and are deferring the receipt of any plan benefits.
So, how does a cash balance plan prove compliance with both
of these statutory provisions in the absence of any legally-binding
guidance? 97 In pure economic terms, in a plan that provides a
uniform cash balance credit of 10% of compensation, a younger
employee and an older employee, each earning a salary of $50,000,
will receive the identical cash balance credit of $5,000. However,
due to the function of compounding interest over a longer period of
time, a $5,000 credit is more valuable to the younger employee.
However, nothing in the statute discusses whether the impact of
economic theorems affect a plan's compliance with the accrued
benefit and rate of benefit accrual rules.
The issue is whether a cash balance design violates the antiage-discrimination rules of ERISA. See sections IV.D.1, IV.E.2,
and IV.G.1 below.
D. Age discrimination- under ADEA
The general purpose of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA")98 is to prevent employment
discrimination based upon age, and the protected class of
employees are those who have attained age forty. The ADEA in
many ways mirrors Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ('Title VI')99
as each shares the common notion of eliminating discrimination in
the workplace. Title VII recognizes a couple theories of liability for
employment discrimination cases, one being disparate impact.
Disparate impact prohibits certain employment practices that
have only a discriminatory effect upon employees. For a plaintiff
to succeed under a disparate impact theory under Title VII, he
must demonstrate that his employer uses neutral factors in its
decision making process which disproportionately impacts a
protected group. Stated another way, employment practices that
95. I.R.C. § 411(c)(3).
96. The heading of I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(G) is "Accrued benefit may not
decrease on account of increasing age or service" whereas the heading at I.R.C.
§ 411(b)(1)(H) is "Continued accrual beyond normal retirement age".
97. See Reduction of Accruals and Allocations Because of the Attainment of
any Age, Application, of Nondiscrimination Cross Testing Rules to Cash
Balance Plans, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,123 (proposed Dec. 11, 2002).
Treasury
Regulations indicating how cash balance plans can comply with the rate of
accrual requirements were published in proposed form in 2002, and, due to
unexpected controversies, have not yet been published in final form.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 621, et. seq. (1996).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991).
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seem fair in form, but are actually discriminatory in operation,
will violate Title VII. Due to the similarities between the ADEA
and Title VII, however, it is unclear whether the ADEA also
recognizes the disparate impact theories. 10 0 The United States
Supreme Court has yet to decide on the issue and the appellate
courts are currently split on an answer: the First, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits have affirmatively held that disparate impact
claims are not available under the ADEA, which is seemingly the
current trend, while the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
continue to hold that such theories are available to plaintiffs.1 0'
The issue is whether cash balance plan designs violate the
anti-age-discrimination rules of ADEA. See sections IV.D.2 and
IV.E.3 below.
E. Protectionof Accrued Benefits
No accrued benefits in a defined benefit plan can be reduced
due to a plan amendment.10 2 For this purpose, accrued benefits
include early retirement benefits and benefit-type subsidies10 3 and
optional forms of benefits. 0 4 Therefore, when a traditional defined
benefit plan is amended into a cash balance design, all early
retirement benefits that a participant is entitled to on the day
before the conversion must be available on the day after the
conversion.
However, some participants who are close to
satisfying the requirements for early retirement benefits will
never be able to grow into such benefits after the conversion. If
the early retirement benefits and subsidies are not preserved after
the conversion, then these participants might argue that the
conversion violates these anti-cutback rules.
The opposite
argument is that if the plan were terminated, all participants who
have not yet earned any early retirement benefits would lose out
on such benefits, so why should an employer's choice to convert
(which arguably impacts benefits for a few participants) be more
problematic than an employer's choice to terminate the plan
altogether (which absolutely impacts the benefits for all
participants).
Here, the issue is whether the calculation of lump sum
distributions, or the calculation of the opening account balances
after the conversion, cause improper forfeitures. See sections
100. See generally Nathan Holmes, The Age DiscriminationIn Employment
Act Of 1967: Are DisparateImpact Claims Available?, 69 U. CIN. L.REV. 299
(2000); Joshua A. Rodine, Does the Cash Ever Balance After Conversion?: An
Examination of Cash Balance Pension Plan Conversions and ADEA Claims, 9
ELDER L.J. 285 (1991) (providing for a more comprehensive analysis of
whether the ADEA recognizes disparate impact claims).
101. Holmes, supra note 100, at 311-18.
102. See, supra note 60.
103. I.R.C. § 411(d)(6)(B)(i); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(2)(A).
104. I.R.C. § 411(d)(6)(B)(ii); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(2)(B).

20041

Cash Balance Plan

IV.B.2, IV.D.5, and IV.F.2 below.
F. Excessive Back-loading
One of the characteristics of a traditional defined benefit plan
is the fact that the most valuable benefit accruals occur when a
participant is close to retirement age. This is commonly referred
Although Congress acknowledged and
to as back-loading.
accepted this back-loading phenomenon, they included provisions
in the statute that limit the amount of back-loading. Congress
provides three methods through which a defined benefit plan can
prove that the accruals are not too back-loaded. Either the plan
document provides that accruals will meet the 3-percent
07
106
or the fractional rule.
method, 10 5 the 133 1/3 percent rule
Since the accrual patterns in a defined contribution plan are frontloaded (or at least ratably-loaded throughout an employee's
career), defined contribution plans do not need to prove that they
are not excessively back-loaded. Cash balance plans, by design,
follow the accrual patterns of a defined contribution plan.
However, cash balance plans, as a form of a defined benefit plan,
must satisfy one of the three accrual methods, none of which were
drafted to ensure that a front-loaded plan can prove non-excessive
back-loading. l 0
The issue is whether a cash balance plan can be designed to
adequately comply with the anti-backloading accrual rules. See
sections IV.B.3, IV.D.4, and IV.G.2 below.
G. PartialTermination
If a defined benefit plan ceases, or simply decreases, future
benefit accruals under the plan, a partial termination shall be
deemed to occur if, as a result of such cessation or decrease, a
potential reversion to the employer, or employers, maintaining the
plan (determined as of the date such cessation or decrease is
adopted) is created or increased. 10 9 Upon a partial termination,
which is determined based on facts and circumstances, 10 all
affected participants must be fully vested in their benefits accrued
as of the date that a partial termination is deemed to have
occurred."'
The issue is whether a cash balance plan conversion might
trigger a partial termination. See section IV.G.3 below.
105. I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(A).
106. I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(B).
107. I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(C); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(C).
108. ERISA was enacted in 1974, and the first cash balance plans appeared
in 1985. Lyons, 221 F.3d at 1238 n.2.
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2(b)(2).
110. Id. § 1.411(d)-2(b)(1).
111. I.R.C. § 411(d)(3).
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H. Breach of FiduciaryDuty
The general rule is that the decision to amend a qualified
plan is a settlor function 1n 2 and only the implementation of the
decision becomes a fiduciary function. However, the employer
(wearing both hats as settlor and as plan fiduciary) needs to set
the opening account balances after the conversion into a cash
balance plan and, if it decides to mitigate some of the lost benefits
for certain older and longer-serviced employees, then it needs to
determine which group of participants will be protected, and how
much protection to offer. The line between settlor function and
fiduciary function is usually blurred, in contexts other than a
conversion to a cash balance plan, and facts and circumstances
will often dictate which hat the employer was wearing for any
given decision.
The issue is whether there is a breach of fiduciary duty when
the plan is converted. See section IV.A.2 below.
I.

Reliance on a DeterminationLetter

Although retirement plans do not need to apply for a
favorable determination letter from the IRS, many sponsoring
employers voluntarily seek the IRS approval that the plan, in
form, complies with the qualification rules.
However, the
determination letter seemingly only indicates that the plan will
remain tax-qualified, but does not seem to protect the sponsoring
employer from an ERISA civil action.
The issue is whether the IRS favorable determination letter
saves the Plan from ERISA liability. See sections IV.B.4 and
IV.C.2 below.

IV. How HAVE THE COURTS DECIDED ON THE ISSUES
THAT ARE BEING LITIGATED?

As discussed, the major controversy over cash balance plans
is the conversion from a traditional defined benefit plan into a
cash balance plan design. Such was the genesis of the following
cases, each involving a plaintiff or class of plaintiffs arguing that
they lost promised benefits, and in some cases, accrued benefits,
due to the conversion. Most of the cases hold that the employer
did not violate the Code or ERISA by converting the respective
plans at issue, and even if they did, that the designs were fine but
that they need to pay slightly higher lump sum distributions.
However, the most recent cases could be very problematic for all

112. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996) (holding that
employers are generally free under ERISA to amend a plan, and when they
undertake those actions, they do not act as fiduciaries, but are analogous to
the settlors of a trust).
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cash balance plans, even those that are newly established and
have never been the result of a conversion.
For purposes of this article, these cases are only
1 4
summarized. 113 Most cases that have subsequently been settled'
or which were unpublished 115 will not be discussed here. The
following are arranged in chronological order, and for each case,
only the cash balance plan design issues are discussed, and the
highest court's holding and rationale for each separate issue is
discussed and represented as either in favor of the plaintiffs, in
favor of the defendant plan, or not decided for procedural reasons.
Each issue contains a summary of how the holding is relevant, and
then there is an overall summary at the end of this section.
116
A. Corcoranv. Bell Atlantic Corp.

The Third Circuit affirmed the holding of the district court in
a table opinion, so the reasoning and holding of the district court
needs to be reviewed. There were two amendments made to the
Plan, a 1991 amendment that increased the age that participants
could retire early with an unreduced service pension, 117 and a 1995
amendment that converted the plan into a cash balance plan that
used a specific published mortality table" 8 and interest rate1 9 to
determine the opening accounts for all participants, and continued
the increase in age for unreduced early retirement benefits that
was instituted in the 1991 amendment. Only the issues for the
1995 amendment will be discussed here.
1. The cash balance plan conversion did not improperly
reduce accrued benefits (undecided):The plaintiffs claimed that the
conversion to the cash balance plan violated ERISA § 204(g) and
improperly reduced accrued benefits through a plan amendment
113. For a more comprehensive analysis, see Howard Shapiro et al.,
Litigation Issues in Cash Balance Plans, 2003 A.B.A. Jt. Comm. on Employee
Benefits teleconference, The Beat Goes On: New Cash Balance Cases That May
Rock
Things,
(Aug.
26,
2003),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/jceb/2003/t030826.html.
114. See, e.g., Engers v. AT&T & AT&T Mgmt. Pension Plan, No. 98-CV3660, 2002 WL 32159586 (D. N.J. Oct. 17, 2002).
115. See, e.g., Godinez v. CBS Corp., No. SA CV 01-28-GLT (ANX) 2002 WL
32155542 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2002).
116. Corcoran v. Bell Atl. Corp., No. Civ. A 97-510, 1997 WL 602859 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 23, 1997), motion to amend denied, 21 Employee Benefits Cas. 2369
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 1997), and affd 159 F.3d 1350 (3d Cir. 1998) (table opinion).
117. Id. at *1. The age was incrementally increased: in 1994, the early
retirement age increased to fifty-six, in 1996, the early retirement age
increased to fifty-seven, and this pattern of a one year increase in age every
two plan years continues (assumedly until the early retirement unreduced
benefits are totally eliminated).
118. Id. The unisex pension 1984 (UP84) mortality factor table was used
without any setback. Id.
119. Id. The PBGC discount rate from September 1995. Id.
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because the manner used in determining the opening account
balances and the continued utilization of the phase out of the early
retirement unreduced benefits had the effect of reducing the "cashout" value of the plan. 120 The court looked at an earlier Third
Circuit decision, the Senate Report accompanying the Retirement
Equity Act of 1984, and IRS Revenue rulings 12' and concluded that
"the only accrued benefits which [ERISA] § 204(g) protects are
those based on years of service already rendered at the time of the
amendment."' 22 The Plaintiffs argued, however, that the plan
used certain mortality and interest assumptions before the
conversion and that the 1995 amendment substituted less
favorable factors that resulted in an impermissible reduction of
accrued benefits.' 23 The court acknowledged that under IRS
guidance, 24 it must look at facts and circumstances to make
certain that the employer is not abusing a loop hole in the law by
implementing a pattern of repeated plan amendments that breaks
down a permanent benefit into a series of window benefits that
can be eliminated at any time. 125 Therefore, instead of granting
the Plan's motion to dismiss, the court permitted discovery to
continue and gave both parties an additional thirty days to provide
the facts and circumstances that would resolve this issue.' 26 Since
the motion to amend was eventually denied and since the
affirmation by the Court of Appeals was simply a tabled
decision, 27 it seems that under these facts, the Plaintiffs were not
able to prove that the selection of assumptions used to determine
opening account balances after the conversion violated ERISA
§ 204(g).
Therefore, in the Third Circuit, courts will look at the facts
and circumstances to determine whether the selection of actuarial
assumptions used to determine opening cash balance account
values, if they differ from the original assumptions, violate the
anti-cutback accrued benefit rules of ERISA § 204(g).
2. There was no breach of fiduciary duty when the plan was
converted: The class of plaintiffs argued that the use of a certain
mortality table and certain interest assumptions to determine the
opening cash balance accounts immediately after the conversion
constituted a breach in fiduciary duty. 28 The court held that "the
act of amending a pension plan does not trigger ERISA's fiduciary
120. Id. at *2.
121. Id. at *2-6.
122. Corcoran, 1997 WL 602859, at *5.
123. Id. at *6.
124. Id. at *7 (citing Rev. Rul. 92-66, 1992-2 C.B. 92, 94, and Treas. Reg.
§ 1.411(d)-4, Q&A 1(c)(1)).
125. Id. at *8.
126. Id.
127. See supra note 116.
128. Corcoran, 1997 WL at *2.
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duties." 129 Thus, the Plan's motion to dismiss for this count was
130
granted.
Therefore, in the Third Circuit, there is no actionable breach
of fiduciary under ERISA for the selection of actuarial equivalents
used to determine opening account balances in the cash balance
plan immediately after the conversion.
B. Esden v. Retirement Plan of FirstNational Bank of Boston

131

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's holding, and remanded back to the district court for further
proceedings to calculate class damages. The plan was converted
into a cash balance plan in 1989, and subsequently received two
favorable determination letters from the IRS indicating that the
IRS believed that the Plan document was in compliance with the
qualification rules of I.R.C. § 401(a). 132 The interest credits to the
cash balance accounts until distribution are based on a floating
rate tied into Treasury Bill rates, but never greater than 10.0% or
less than 5.5%.133 However, once a participant elects to receive an
immediate distribution of his or her account balance, then the
account is credited with interest at 4% until retirement to
determine the normal retirement annuity benefit, and then is
discounted at the minimum rate of 5.5% since the actual plan rate
34
is variable.1
1. The determinationof a lump sum distribution must be the
present value of the normal retirement benefits: The Plaintiff
(individually and on behalf of a similarly situated class) contends
that when she was paid her cash balance account, it was less than
the required distribution 135 (under the requirements of ERISA
136
§§ 203(e) and 205(g)(3) and I.R.C. §§ 411(a)(11) and 417(e)(3)).
The defendant countered that the court should rely on the Plan's
favorable determination letter issued by the IRS, and argued for
the first time on appeal that the Treasury Regulations published
under I.R.C. §§ 411 and 417 are unreasonable. 137 The district
court granted the Plan's motion for summary judgment, indicating
that deference to Notice 96-8 would allow "[t]he participant... [to]
receive a windfall, and the account balance could no longer be said
to reflect an accurate projection of plan benefits as they accrue [in
129. Id. at *9 (citing Lockheed Corp., 517 U.S. at 116).
130. Id. at*10.
131. 182 F.R.D. 432 (D. Vt. 1998), motion to alter or amend the judgment
denied, 5 F.Supp.2d (D. Vt. 1998) (unpublished), rev'd 229 F.3d 154 (2d Cir.
2000), cert. denied 531 U.S. 1061 (2001).
132. Esden, 229 F. 3d at 159.
133. Id. at 160.
134. Id. at 161.
135. Id. at 162.
136. Id. at 168.
137. Id. at 162.
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the cash balance plan]." 138 However, the appellate court reversed,
indicating that: first, the normal retirement benefit in a defined
benefit plan must be expressed as an annuity commencing at
normal retirement age; 139 and second, if the distribution will be in
the form of a lump sum, then the Plan must determine the lump
sum in accordance with I.R.C. §§ 411(a)(11) and 417(e)(3). 140 The
court determined that Notice 96-8 should be given deference
because it "represents the fair and considered judgment of the
IRS,"141 and, even without regard to the Notice, the court would
reach the same result "on the basis of the governing statutes and
regulations."1 42 To sum this up, the court stated that a "defined
benefit plan, including one adopting a cash balance format, need
not offer a lump-sum distribution as an optional form of benefit,
but when it does so provide, that distribution must be the
actuarial equivalent of the accrued benefit valued according to the
statutory methodology."1 43 Thus, the appellate court remanded
the case back to the district court for further proceedings to
calculate class damages, and with instructions for the lower court
to "determine the proper projection rate for the calculation of
damages, provided only that in no event may the projection rate be
less than the minimum 5.5% guaranteed under the terms of the
plan."144
Therefore, in the Second Circuit, cash balance plans must
comply with Notice 96-8 when they determine minimum lump
sums for distributions, even if such minimum exceeds the
hypothetical account balances communicated in the plan.
2. The calculation of the lump sum distribution caused
improper forfeitures: The court further held that by "making part
of her benefit conditional on the form of payment chosen[,] the
Plan made that benefit forfeitable, in violation of ERISA § 203(a);
I.R.C. § 411(a)(2) and Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-4T."' 145 The court
based its holding on the portion of Notice 96-8 that describes cash
balance plans with interest credits that are tied to a variable index
(such as the Bank of Boston Plan at issue): first, "the plan must
prescribe a method for determining the rate at which future
interest credits will be applied to project the participant's accrued
benefit as of normal retirement age;"' 146 and second, "in
determining the amount of an employee's accrued benefit, a
forfeiture... will result if the value of future interest credits is
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Esden, 182 F.R.D. at 438.
Esden, 229 F.3d at 162.
Id. at 164-65.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 173 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 177.
Esden, 229 F.3d at 168.
Id. at 166.
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projected using a rate that understates the value of those credits or
if the plan by its terms reduces the interest rate or rate of return
used for projecting future interest credits." 147 Under these facts,
the court found that the Plan complied with the first requirement
under Notice 96-8,148 but failed to meet the second requirement,
indicating that "by fixing the future interest credits at 4.0% for the
purpose of the projections ... the Plan conditions the right to
receive the additional 1.5% interest on the form of distribution
that the participant elects." 149 Thus, the court held that the
portion of the lump sum that should have been paid to the Plaintiff
based on the additional 1.5% crediting rate was improperly
forfeited, in violation of ERISA § 203(a).
Therefore, in the Second Circuit, if a cash balance plan
provides interest credits that are tied into a variable index, then
the relevant portions of Notice 96-8 must be complied with to
prevent an improper forfeiture.
3.
Cash balance plans must meet the anti-backloading
accrual rules (undecided): Although it appears that the Plaintiffs
did not argue the point, through dicta, the court opined that the
Plan could only satisfy the 133 1/3% accrual rule (under I.R.C.
§ 411(b)(1)(B) and ERISA § 204(b)(1)(B)) if it used the 5.5%
15 0
crediting rate instead of the 4.0% rate that was actually used.
Therefore, in the Second Circuit, cash balance plans will
likely need to prove compliance with the accrual rules if
questioned by the Plaintiffs.
4. The IRS favorable determination letter does not save the
Plan from ERISA liability: The court held that "the Plan's reliance
on determination letters cannot shield it from liability in a suit
brought by a plan participant for violations of ERISA.151
Therefore, in the Second Circuit, although favorable
determination letters might ensure the tax qualified status of a
retirement plan, it in no way affects the ERISA rights provided to
participants of a cash balance plan.
C. Lyons v. Georgia-PacificCorp. SalariedEmployees Retirement
152
Plan
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's holding, and remanded back to the district court for further
proceedings to calculate class damages, which is still ongoing. The
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
2000),

Id. at 167.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 167 n.18.
Esden, 229 F.3d at 176.
66 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (N.D. Ga. 1999), rev'd 221 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.
cert. denied 532 U.S. 967 (2001), remanded to 196 F. Supp. 2d 1260

(N.D. Ga. 2002).
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plan was converted into a cash balance plan before the Plaintiff
became a participant due to a merger of his employer into GeorgiaPacific. 153 The Plan had received two favorable determination
letters from the IRS indicating that the IRS believed that the Plan
document was in compliance with the qualification rules of I.R.C.
§ 401(a).154 The interest credits to the cash balance accounts until
distribution are based on the PBGC twelve-month "immediate"
annuity interest rate for the preceding year plus 0.75%.155
However, once a participant elects to receive an immediate
distribution of his or her account balance, the value of the cash
156
balance account will be distributed.
1. The determinationof a lump sum distribution must be the
present value of the normal retirement benefits: The Plaintiff
(individually, since procedurally, the class certification of other
potential plaintiffs is at issue) contends that when he was paid his
cash balance account, it was less than the required distribution
under the requirements of ERISA § 203(e)(2) 157 (and I.R.C.
§§ 411(a)(11) and 417(e)(3)). The defendant Plan countered that
the court should rely on the Plan's favorable determination letter
issued by the IRS,158 and argued that the Treasury Regulations
published under I.R.C. § 411 are unreasonable.1 59 The district
court granted the Plan's motion for summary judgment, indicating
that "the portion of Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-11 at issue in this case
[is] an unreasonable construction of the congressional mandate set
forth in ERISA § 203(e). '' 160
However, the Court of Appeals
reversed, countering that "[because Congress has not spoken
directly to the precise issue, because the legislative history is
ambiguous, and because Treasury Regulation 1.411(a)-li is not
unreasonable, at least insofar as it applies to the specific type of
plan in this case, Treasury Regulation 1.411(a)-li is due to be
upheld." 161
The court determined that "Treasury Regulation
§ 1.417(e)-1, which was in effect at the time of the distribution,
unequivocally states that '[t]he present value of any optional form
of benefit cannot be less than the present value of the normal
retirement benefit determined in accordance
with this
paragraph' ' 162 and that "Treasury Regulations 1.411(a)-li, which
was issued in 1988, requires the lump sum distributions under the
Plan be calculated by determining what would have been the
153. Lyons, 221 F.3d at 1239.
154. Id. at 1240.

155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1238.
1238-39.
1240.

1252.

159. Lyons, 221 F.3d at 1248.
160. Lyons, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1336.
161. Lyons, 221 F.3d at 1249.

162. Id. at 1251.
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normal retirement benefit had the participant not elected to take
an early lump sum distribution, and then discounting that amount
to [a] present value using the PBGC rate prescribed in ERISA
§ 203(e)."163 Thus, the appellate court remanded the case back to
the district court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.'6 4 On remand, the district court agreed that the cash
balance accounts should be credited with the Plan's stated
crediting rate until age sixty-five, but denied granting either
party's summary judgment motions and determined that evidence
will need to be presented by both sides to determine the actual
discount rate to use under I.R.C. § 417(e)(3) and the Court of
Appeals opinion, and would further need to argue whether the
discount can include pre-retirement mortality (an issue that was
65
not decided in the Appellate opinion).1
Therefore, in the Eleventh Circuit, cash balance plans must
comply with Treasury Regulations under I.R.C. §§ 411 and 417
and Notice 96-8 when they determine minimum lump sums for
distributions, even if such minimum exceeds the hypothetical
account balances communicated in the plan.
2. The IRS favorable determination letter does not save the
Plan from ERISA liability: The court relied on the amicus brief
filed by the IRS and held that since the determination letter itself
"does not specifically address the issue at hand, the IRS letter is
not owed any deference."166 Further, "the IRS determination letter
is due no deference because it evidences no investigation or legal
analysis of the facts by the IRS."167
Therefore, in the Eleventh Circuit, although favorable
determination letters might ensure the tax qualified status of a
retirement plan, it in no way protects the Plan from liability to
participants.
D. Eaton v. Onan Corp.168
The district court granted the Plan's motion for summary
judgment on two counts, but denied summary judgment for three
other counts. The employer originally maintained a defined
benefit plan and a profit sharing plan that collectively constituted
a "floor-offset" arrangement, and in 1989, the defined benefit plan

163. Id. at 1252.
164. Id. at 1254.
165. Lyons, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 1273. According to Eva Cantarella, plaintiff's
attorney, the settlement discussions are still ongoing, but are close to being
finalized (comments made on April 1, 2004 at a meeting of the ERISA

Litigation Subcommittee of the Chicago Bar Association Employee Benefits
Committee).
166. Lyons, 221 F.3d at 1252.

167. Id.
168. 117 F. Supp. 2d 812 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
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was converted to a cash. balance plan. 169 Under the cash balance
plan design, if a participant elects an annuity form of distribution,
then he or she will be entitled to the greater of (i) the actuarial
equivalent of the cash balance account, (ii) a defined "minimum
annuity," or (iii) a defined "grandfathered annuity;" however, if the
participant elects a lump sum distribution, then he or she is just
entitled to the account balance without regard to a minimum or
grandfathered benefit. 170 The facts indicate that the employer
made reasonable attempts to properly communicate the cash
balance design to the plan participants,171 and tried to get a
favorable determination letter from the IRS which was not
granted but which was ultimately forwarded to the IRS national
72
office for review.1
1. The cash balance plan design does not violate the anti-agediscriminationrules of ERISA. The class of plaintiffs argued that
in order to determine that the rate of benefit accruals do not
decrease on account of age, in violation of ERISA § 204(b)(1)(H),
the Plan must first convert the cash balanced accounts into
annuities.173 The court determined that for two separate reasons,
as a matter of law, a Plan may use cash balance accounts
expressed as annuities to determine rate of accruals, but nothing
in ERISA, its legislative history, or its associated public policy
concerns require it. 174 The two reasons were: first, because of the
heading of the statue, the requirement of a comparison of rates of
benefit accruals "were intended to ensure that employees who
choose to work past the age of normal retirement continue to
accrue benefits, albeit with some important restrictions;"'' 75 and,
second, even if the provision does apply to participants who have
not yet attained normal retirement age, the "court does not believe
those statutes require that the rate of benefit accrual be measured
solely in terms of [a] change in value of an annuity payable at
normal retirement age."' 76 Thus, the court granted the Plan's
motion for summary judgment.
Therefore, even though this case was subsequently settled, it
seems that in the Southern District of Indiana, as a matter of law,
cash balance plans do not inherently violate the age discrimination
provisions of ERISA. However, as discussed at IV.G.1 below,
another district court in the same Seventh Circuit issued a totally
opposite opinion. 177 Therefore, until settled by the Seventh
169. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 819.
170. Id. at 820-21.
171. Id. at 821.

172. Id.
173. Id. at 823.
174. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 834.
175. Id. at 826.

176. Id.
177. See infra notes 223-241 and accompanying text.
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Circuit, this crucial issue is left unresolved..
2. The cash balanceplan design does not violate the anti-agediscrimination rules of the ADEA: The plaintiffs argued that the
cash balance design, which includes a minimum and
grandfathered annuity if a participant elects to receive an annuity,
but which omits such minimum and grandfathered benefit
amounts if the same participant elects to receive a lump sum
distribution, violated the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. 178 However, to prove this contention, the plaintiffs needed to
use the "disparate impact" theory of liability, and the court
reminded them that the "Seventh Circuit has clearly held that
disparate impact claims are not recognizable under the ADEA."179
Thus, the court granted the Plan's motion for summary judgment
because plaintiffs have failed to establish a claim for disparate
treatment under the ADEA (the recognized argument under the
ADEA in the Seventh Circuit). 18o
Therefore, in the Seventh Circuit, plaintiffs must prove
disparate treatment under the ADEA and cannot prove their
ADEA age discrimination claim after the conversion to a cash
balance plan under the theory of disparate impact.
3. The determinationof a lump sum distribution must be the
present value of the normal retirement benefits (unresolved): The
plaintiffs further claimed that the Plan did not properly value the
lump sum distributions because they did not include the
grandfathered benefits.18 '
The defendants countered that
minimum lump sum distribution rules under I.R.C. § 417(e) only
apply to involuntary "automatic cash-outs" of a defined benefit
plan and not to lump sum distributions that are voluntarily
elected. 182 Since the Eleventh and Second Circuits had just held,
in Lyons v. Georgia Pacific and in Esden v. Bank of Boston,
respectively, that I.R.C. § 417(e) applies to all lump sum
distributions, regardless of whether it is voluntary or involuntary,
then this court would not go against the trend. 183 Thus, the court
could not grant summary judgment for either party, and it
instructed the parties to develop an orderly resolution of this
84
issue.
Therefore, even though this case was subsequently settled, it
seems that in the Southern District of Indiana, the minimum lump
sum calculations under I.R.C. § 417(e) apply to all lump sum
distributions from all defined benefit plans (including cash balance
plans), regardless of whether they are voluntary elections or
178. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 835.

179. Id. at 837.
180. Id.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 840.
Id. at 842.
Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 842.
Id. at 843.
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involuntary cash outs.
4.
Cash balance plans must meet the anti-backloading
accrual rules (undecided): The plaintiffs further argued that the
Plan failed to meet any of the three required benefit accrual rules
for defined benefit plans; specifically, the Plan did not meet the
133 1/3% rule. 8 5 The court indicated that the IRS Key District
found that the Plan failed to meet any of the benefit accrual rules,
and that there was a pending Tax Court case brought by another
Onan Corp. employee. 86 Thus, the court could not grant summary
judgment for either party, and this issue will require further
18 7
exploration before it can be decided.
Therefore, in the Southern District of Indiana, the issue of
whether cash balance plans, by design, can satisfy any of the three
benefit accrual rules that prevent excessive back-loading, is
undecided and will probably be decided on a facts and
circumstances basis in future cases rather than as a matter of law.
5. The calculation of opening cash balance accounts cannot
cause improper forfeitures (undecided): The final relevant claim
that the plaintiffs argued before the court was that the Plan
improperly used different interest rates that produced understated
opening account balances and overstated profit sharing plan
offsets, in violation of ERISA § 203(a). 8 8 The Plan countered that
the use of different interest rates is not unreasonable as a matter
of law. 8 9 Thus, the court could not grant summary judgment for
either party, and the court finds that there is a material issue of
fact that ultimately needs to be resolved. 90
Therefore, in the Southern District of Indiana, the issue of
whether actuarial equivalents are reasonable in a cash balance
plan, will probably be decided on a facts and circumstances basis
in future cases rather than as a matter of law.
E.

Campbell v. BankBoston, NA1 91

The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's granting of the Plan's motion for summary judgment. The
plan was converted into a cash balance plan in 1989 and was then
amended in 1997.192 After the conversion, the plan contained a
"Benefit Safeguard Minimum Benefit," which provided that
benefits under the previous plan design would continue to accrue
for certain long-term employees, 93 but the subsequent 1997
185. Id.
186. Id. at 844.
187. Id. at 845.
188. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 22d at 846.

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 206 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D. Mass. 2002), affd 327 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003).
192. Campbell, 327 F.3d at 3.

193. Id. at 2.
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amendment eliminated the further accrual of benefits under the
old plan design and froze all grandfathered benefits as of
December 31, 1996.194 There was a separate plan at issue, a
separation pay plan, 195 which will not be discussed here.
1. The cash balance plan conversion did not improperly
reduce accrued benefits: The individual plaintiff was one of the
long-serviced employees that was grandfathered after the 1989
conversion, and argued that the reduction in benefit amount after
the 1997 amendment to the cash balance plan (i.e., the elimination
of future benefit accruals) constituted a forfeiture of accrued
benefits
in violation
of ERISA
§ 204(g)
(and I.R.C.
§ 411(d)(6)(A)).196 The court determined that the ERISA anticutback provision only protected "accrued benefits" and that the
1997 amendment properly protected the benefits accrued as of that
date. 197 Thus, the court affirmed the district court, and held that
"no accrued benefits were reduced; only expected benefits were
reduced, which BankBoston could, under the law, modify or
8
eliminate."19
Therefore, in the First Circuit, a cash balance plan can be
amended to eliminate future promised benefits, as long as the
benefits accrued as of the date of plan. amendment are not
reduced.
2. The cash balance plan design did not violate the anti-agediscrimination rules of ERISA (undecided): The plaintiff argued
that the "cash balance plan violates the anti-discrimination
provisions of ERISA." 199 The court determined that, procedurally,
the plaintiff did not raise the issue at the lower court, because in
the complaint, only violations of the age discrimination provisions
of ADEA were raised but not the age discrimination provisions of
ERISA.200 Thus, the issue was not decided by the Court of
Appeals. However, since the court felt that this issue may be
raised by a plaintiff through future litigation, it "briefly describe[d]
the controversy" 20 1 and indicated that the IRS has issued proposed
regulations in December 2002 describing how cash balance plans
can comply with the anti-discrimination rules of ERISA.202 The
court further opined that "the ERISA age discrimination provision
may not even apply to workers younger than the age of normal
retirement."203
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 8.
Campbell, 327 F.3d at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Campbell, 327 F.3d at 10.
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Therefore, in the First Circuit, although the court did not hold
that as a matter of law cash balance plans do not inherently
violate the age discrimination provisions of ERISA, the court
questioned whether the rules apply to participants who have not
yet attained retirement age and opined that the proposed
Treasury Regulations should at least be afforded some deference.
However, as discussed below at IV.G.1, a district court in the
Seventh Circuit issued a totally opposite opinion.
3. The cash balance plan design did not violate the anti-agediscrimination rules of the ADEA (undecided): The plaintiff argued
that the cash balance design, after conversion, violated the ADEA
because the employer "knew that the decrease in pension benefits
as a result of the conversion to the cash balance plan would be
particularly adverse to older workers. ''204 The court determined
that, procedurally, this claim was barred because the charge was
205
originally filed with the EEOC "beyond the limitations period."
Thus, the issue was not decided by the Court of Appeals; however,
the court questioned whether the First Circuit would accept a
"disparate impact" claim under the ADEA if a plaintiff who is not
barred by the statute of limitations should argue it in future
206
litigation.
Therefore, in the First Circuit, plaintiffs must prove disparate
treatment under the ADEA and probably cannot prove their
ADEA age discrimination claim after the conversion to a cash
balance plan under the theory of disparate impact.
20 7
F. Berger v. Xerox

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's series of decisions granting of the Plan's motion for
summary judgment. Xerox originally maintained two plans that,
collectively, created a 'floor-offset' arrangement" (a profit sharing
plan and a pension plan called the Retirement Income Guarantee
Plan ("RIGP")).208 In 1990, the profit sharing plan was terminated
and the assets were transferred into the RIPG and, for each
participant, were segregated into "Transitional Retirement
204. Id. at 9.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 10 n.9.
207. Berger v. Xerox Ret. Income Guar. Plan, 231 F. Supp. 2d 804 (S.D. Ill.
2002), aff'd and modified, 338 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2003). The original case was
Berger v. Nazametz & Xerox Corporation Retirement Income Guarantee Plan,
No. 00-CV-0584-DRH, 2001 WL 936322 (S.D. Ill. June 26, 2001), with a
subsequent motion to reconsider at 157 F. Supp. 2d 998 (S.D. Ill. 2001), and
then a granting in part of plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, 2002 WL
1774744 (S.D. Ill. July 22, 2002). Subsequently, Nazametz was dropped as a
defendant since she was never the Plan Administrator at any time relevant to
this action.
208. Nazametz, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1001-02.
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Account" 20 9 ("TRA"). At the same time, the original defined benefit
design of the RIGP was converted into a cash balance design, and
the opening account balances for all participants, referred to as
"Cash Balance Retirement Accounts" ("CBRA"), were equal to the
opening amount in their TRAs (so that, "[flor participants who did
not have a PSP benefit, the CBRA opening balance was zero, and
there was no TRA.") 2 10 After the transfer, this single plan still
acted as a floor-offset arrangement, but was governed under I.R.C.
§ 414(k) (and ERISA § 3(35)(A) and (B)) because it had certain
defined contribution attributes (i.e., the TRAs) and certain defined
benefit attributes (i.e., the CBRAs). 21' Then, the single plan was
amended further in 1998 to include an enhanced benefit, called a
"RIGP Plus" benefit, for certain older and longer-serviced
employees. 212 The terms of the general cash balance plan design
provided a 5% of compensation accrual and interest credits equal
to "the effective average yield for one-year Treasury bills measured
as of the first business day of each month of the prior year, plus
one percent;" 21 3 however, when a participant elects a lump sum
distribution, the projection will be made at "the PBGC rate(s) plus
a mortality factor."214 Since the single plan is still a floor-offset,
the CBRA will be entirely disregarded if a participant's TRA
exceeds his or her CBRA.215
1. The determination of a lump sum distribution must be the
present value of the normal retirement benefits: The class of
plaintiffs argued that the amount they received, after electing
lump sum distributions, was not the actuarial equivalent of what
they would have received either as an annuity or a lump sum had
they waited until age 65 (under the requirements of ERISA
§ 204(c)(3) 2 16 (and I.R.C. §§ 411(c)(3)). The defendant countered
that since "the employee's entitlement to future interest credits
terminates when he takes a distribution, which he can do at any
time after his entitlement to a pension vests, the only benefit that
he accrues is... the hypothetical cash balance on that date; and so
However, the court
that is his lump sum entitlement." 21 7
determined that the cash balance plan is indeed a defined benefit
plan, and it "triggers the congressional policy of requiring that a
lump-sum distribution of pension benefits equal the value of the
benefits if the employee decides to wait until the normal

209. Id. at 1002.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1003.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1002.
Nazametz, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1008.
Id. at 1008 n.10.
Berger, 338 F.3d at 759.
Id. at 761.
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retirement age and take them then in the form of a pension." 218
The court then decreed, in a scathing manner, that the
participants "are, in short, being invited to sell their pension
entitlement back to the company cheap, and that is a sale that
ERISA prohibits."2 19 Thus, the court affirmed the district court's
finding in favor of the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on
this issue.
The court further affirmed the district court's
prohibition against the Plan's use of a pre-retirement mortality
assumption, and even called the Plan's argument in favor of the
220
discount as "unfathomable."
Therefore, in the Seventh Circuit, cash balance plans must
convert hypothetical accounts into annuities payable at retirement
before determining the minimum lump sum payable to
participants who elect to receive lump sum distributions before
retirement age.
2. The calculation of the lump sum distribution caused
improper forfeitures: The court determined that Notice 96-8 must
be complied with, and further held that the "plan conditions the
employee's right to future interest credits on the form of the
distribution that he elects to take (pension at age sixty-five rather
than lump sum now), which is precisely what the law forbids."221
The Plan had argued that its cash balance plan is not the same as
the plan described in Notice 96-8 and is instead a hybrid cash
balance plan, but the court disagreed, and in another villifying
attack on the defendant plan, stated that "for 'hybrid' read
'unlawful'." 222
Therefore, in the Seventh Circuit, if a cash balance plan
provides interest credits that are tied into a variable index, then
the relevant portions of Notice 96-8 must be complied with to
prevent an improper forfeiture, and if the plan provides a preretirement death benefit, then the plan may not use a preretirement mortality discount factor.

G. Cooper v.IBM PersonalPension Plan223
The district court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment on two major counts, but denied summary judgment for
two other counts. The plan was amended in 1995 to provide a
pension equity formula (which is a type of cash balance plan), with
a pension credit formula based on points credited, and which
218. Id. Note that the Court of Appeals decision is lacking legal support or
reference to any of the lower court's opinions for this conclusion, but support
can be found at Nazametz, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1008.
219. Berger, 338 F.3d at 762.
220. Id. at 764.
221. Id. at 763 (agreeing with the Second Circuit's decision in Esden).
222. Id. at 762-63.
223. 274 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ill. 2003).
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provided certain base points for the participant's age in the
determination year (to a maximum of 425 base points) and extra
points if the participant's five year average salary exceeds the
Social Security taxable wage base (limited to seventy-five excess
points). 224 Then, in 1999, this plan was converted to a common
cash balance design, where, each month, a participant's Personal
Pension Account accumulates pay credits of 5% of pay and interest
credits at a rate that is one point higher than the rate of return on
one year treasury securities. 225 Since the plaintiff class contends
that both types of cash balance formulas are age-discriminatory,
each type of plan design will be discussed below.
1.
The cash balance plan design violates the anti-agediscriminationrules of ERISA- There are two statutory provisions
that seek to prevent discrimination in defined benefit plans based
on age: first, the prohibition from reducing an accrued benefit on
account of increasing age under ERISA § 204(b)(1)(G) and I.R.C.
§ 411(b)(1)(G); and second, the prohibition from ceasing an
employee's benefit accrual or reducing the rate of an employee's
benefit accrual because of the attainment of any age under ERISA
§ 204(b)(1)(H) and I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(H).
Regarding the first provision, the Plaintiffs argue only that
the Pension Credit Formula violates the rules. 226 There is a lack of
cited legal authority in the opinion; the court seems to make its
conclusion based solely on a hypothetical scenario where some
2
potential participants might be discriminated under the PCF.2 7
Although the Plan argues that the court should only look at actual
participants, and insists that "no specific employee has actually
suffered a reduction in his or her benefit," 228 the court rejected
their argument, holding that the statute "relates to damages as
opposed to liability and because Congress has conferred statutory
standing to all 'participants' in an ERISA plan." 229 Thus, the court
granted the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on this
issue."

230

Regarding the second provision, the Plaintiffs argued that
both the Pension Credit Formula and the Personal Pension
Account designs violate the rules. 231 Since ERISA is not clear in
the statute, the court needs to make an analysis as to whether the
terms "accrued benefit" and "rate of benefit accruals" have the
same meaning. 232 The court dismissed the Plan's argument that
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1012-13.
Id. at 1013.
Id. at 1014-15.
Id. at 1015.
Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1015.
Id. at 1022.
Id. at 1015, 1020.
Id. at 1016.
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Congress intentionally used two different terms to mean two
different things, 233 and held that the "answer is simple [and that]
Congress chose to be grammatically correct. 234 Thus, the court
held that the Pension Credit Formula (i.e., the pension equity
formula) violated the statute and granted the Plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment. The court continued its analysis in regards to
the Personal Pension Account, and discounted the Plan's
argument that the affect of the time value of money has no
relevance in the analysis, holding that the "CBF violates the
literal terms of ERISA § 204(b)(1)(H)."235 Thus, the court also held
that the Personal Pension Account (i.e., the cash balance formula)
violated the statute and granted the Plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment. It is interesting that even though the court
held against the Plan, it commented that "there may be policy
reasons why Congress should specifically authorize [cash balance
plans] in the context of defined benefit plans. But the narrow
question is whether the 1999 Plan comports with the literal and
unambiguous provisions of ERISA § 204(b)(1)(H), and it does
23 6

not."

Therefore, in the Southern District of Illinois, as a matter of
law, cash balance plans do inherently violate the age
discrimination provisions of ERISA; however, as discussed above,
the Eaton v. Onan Corp. case, previously decided by another
district court in the same Seventh Circuit, issued a totally opposite
opinion. Even though Eaton has been settled, its logic remains
valid. Therefore, until settled by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, this most crucial issue is now left unresolved.
2.
Cash balance plans must meet the anti-backloading
accrual rules (undecided): The Plaintiffs further argued that the
Pension Credit Formula failed to meet any of the three required
benefit accrual rules for defined benefit plans. 237 The court
rejected the Plan's description of how it passed the fractional rule
test. 238 Thus, the court could not grant summary judgment for
either party, and there is a triable issue of fact regarding the back239
loading claim.
Therefore, in the Southern District of Illinois, the issue of
whether cash balance plans, by design, can satisfy any of the three
benefit accrual rules that prevent excessive back-loading, is
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1021.
236. Id. at 1022 (emphasis added). Note that the court earlier stated that
"ERISA does not explicitly answer this question," but then seemingly ignored
such statement and indicated that it understood the literal and unambiguous
language of this provision. Id. at 1015.
237. Id. at 1016.
238. Id. at 1017.
239. Id. at 1023.
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undecided and will probably be decided on a facts and
circumstances basis in future cases rather than as a matter of law.
3. Cash balance plan conversions might trigger a partial
termination (undecided): The Plaintiffs further argued that the
conversion to the Personal Pension Account design might have
caused a partial plan termination (under I.R.C. § 411(d)(3))
because (1) the amendment resulted in a decrease in future benefit
accruals and (2) such decrease increased the potential for a
reversion. 240 The court could not grant summary judgment for
either party, and there is a triable issue of fact regarding the
241
partial termination claim.
Therefore, in the Southern District of Illinois, the issue of
whether a cash balance plan conversion will trigger a partial
termination, is undecided and will probably be decided on a facts
and circumstances basis in future cases rather than as a matter of
law.
H. Summary of cash balanceplan litigation to date
1. Does a cash balance plan conversion improperly reduce
accrued benefits? (Wear-away, section III.A. above): The Third
Circuit (Corcoran) ultimately held in favor of the Plan based on
facts and circumstances; and, the First Circuit (Campbell) held in
favor of the Plan.
2. Must the determination of a lump sum distribution be the
present value of the normal retirement benefits? (Whipsaw, the
treatment of future interest credits as accrued benefits, and the
need to comply with Notice 96-8, section III.B. above): The Second
Circuit (Esden) held in favor of the Plaintiffs; the Eleventh Circuit
(Lyons) held in favor of the Plaintiff; and the Seventh Circuit
(Berger) held in favor of the Plaintiff (since Berger was decided
after the Southern District of Indiana decided on Eaton, its logic is
rendered irrelevant).
3. Does the cash balance plan design violate the anti-agediscriminationrules of ERISA? (ERISA age discrimination,section
III.C. above): The Southern District of Indiana (Eaton) held in
favor of the Plan (even though the case has subsequently settled);
the First Circuit (Campbell) did not decide because of procedural
reasons (but opined that it would probably hold in favor of the
Plan); and the Southern District of Illinois (Cooper)held in favor of
the Plaintiff.
4. Does the cash balance plan design violate the anti-agediscrimination rules of ADEA? (ADEA age discrimination,section
III.D. above): The Southern District of Indiana (Eaton) held in
favor of the Plan, because the Seventh Circuit does not accept
240. Id. at 1022.
241. Id.
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disparate impact theories; and the First Circuit (Campbell) did not
decide because of procedural reasons (but opined that the First
Circuit would probably not accept disparate impact theories).
5. Does the calculation of lump sum distributions, or the
calculation of opening cash balance accounts, cause improper
forfeitures? (Protection of accrued benefits, section III.E. above):
The Second Circuit (Esden) held in favor of the Plaintiffs; and the
Seventh Circuit (Berger) held in favor of the Plaintiffs (since the
Berger case was decided after the Southern District of Indiana
decided on Eaton, its logic is rendered irrelevant).
6. Must cash balanceplans meet the anti-backloadingaccrual
rules? (Excessive Back Loading, section III.F. above): The Second
Circuit (Esden) was undecided because it could not grant summary
judgment for either party (but indicated through dicta that the
Plan would have failed to prove compliance); and the Seventh
Circuit (Berger) was undecided because it could not grant
summary judgment for either party (since the Berger case was
decided after the Southern District of Indiana decided on Eaton,
its logic is rendered irrelevant).
7. Does a cash balance plan conversion trigger a partial
termination? (Excessive Back Loading, section III.G. above): The
Southern District of Illinois (Cooper) was undecided because it
could not grant summary judgment for either party.
8. Is there a breach of fiduciary duty when a plan is converted
into a cash balanceplan? (Breach of FiduciaryDuty, section III.H.
above): The Third Circuit (Corcoran)held in favor of the Plan.
9. Does an IRS favorable determination letter save the plan
from ERISA liability? (Reliance on a Determination Letter, section
III.1. above): The Second Circuit (Esden) held in favor of the
Plaintiff; and the Eleventh Circuit (Lyons) held in favor of the
Plaintiff.
V. HOW DOES THE GOVERNMENT TREAT CASH BALANCE PLANS?

The executive branch of government, through its various
regulatory agencies, seems to support cash balance plan designs,
or, at the very least, acknowledge their importance in the
retirement plan universe. However, in the legislative branch,
there are some voices that seem to oppose cash balance plans. The
various view points will be summarized.
A.

What is the Departmentof Treasury'sposition?

The Department of Treasury ("DOT') seems to accept cash
balance plans through published guidance: (1) Notice 96-8,242
which explains how cash balance plans can be designed to avoid
the anti-backloading accrual rules, explains how lump sum
242. I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359.
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distributions need to be calculated, and asks for public comments
for future cash balance plan guidance; (2) preambles to 1991 and
1993 regulations under I.R.C. § 401(a)(4); 243 and recently proposed
regulations under I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(G) and (H),244 which give CB
plans special rules to pass the rate of benefit accrual rules.
Additionally, the IRS has routinely issued favorable determination
letters for new cash balance plans (although there is a moratorium
245
on determination letters for cash balance plan conversions).
Therefore, although they are trying to mold how cash balance
plans can comply with the qualification rules, there seems to be
affirmative support for the cash balance plan design by the DOT.
B. What is the Department of Labor's position?
The Department of Labor ("DOL") has yet to come out with an
official position regarding cash balance plans. It does however
acknowledge and provide information on them, which would
ostensibly seem to shed a positive viewpoint on them. The DOL
has posted on their website under the Employee Benefits Security
Administration section some frequently asked questions ("FAQs")
for cash balance plans. 246 Additionally, the form 5500 allows a
defined benefit plan to indicate that it has cash balance plan
features. 247 Therefore, the DOL certainly views cash balance
designs as acceptable under the current statutory framework.
C. What is the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation'sposition?
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC")
undoubtedly accepts cash balance plans as defined benefit plans.
Like the other agencies, however, there are no specific statements
243. Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 8359 (1991). This regulation indicated a safe
harbor for cash balance plans in the final nondiscrimination regulations. Id.
After the 1991 final regulations were rescinded and reissued in final form in
1993, the preamble, T.D. 8485 (1993) indicated that Treasury would need to
further review cash balance plan designs.
244. REG-209500-86; REG-164464-02 (Dec. 11, 2002).
245. Colleen T. Congel, Cash Balance Plans: IRS Instructs EP Personnel to
Identify, Refer all Conversion Cases for Technical Advice, BNA PENSION AND
BENEFITS DAILY, Sept. 17, 1999.
246. U.S. Department of Labor, Frequently Asked Questions about Cash
Balance
Pension
Plans,
at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/FAQs/faqconsumer_cashbalanceplans.html
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2003).
247. The reporting requirements of ERISA §§ 104 and 4065, and I.R.C.
§ 6058, are satisfied when employee benefit plans file a Form 5500, Annual
Report/Return of Employee Benefit Plan, with the Department of Labor. The

plan characteristics are entered in line 10 of the form, and characteristic code
1C is used for cash balance plans, which according to the instructions, is a
plan, whatever it is called, that "rather than or in addition to expressing the

accrued benefit as a benefit commencing at normal retirement age, defines
benefits for each employee in terms more common to a defined contribution

plan, such as a single sum distribution amount."
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of the legal rationale for such plans, only general sweeping
statements. On the PBGC website, there are copies of remarks,
public information publications, and PBGC regulations that all
accept cash balance plans as defined benefit plans, properly under
the purview of the PBGC.248 In fact, the PBGC published a
request for comments 249 on how the PBGC can value the liabilities
of a cash balance plan 250 that uses a variable index (such as using
the GATT § 417(e) rate, which changes each year). In the request
for public comments, the PBGC indicated that they need input on
how to administer the termination of cash balance plans since
Congress only anticipated terminations of traditional defined
benefit plans when ERISA was enacted in 1974.
D.

What is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
position?

In September 1999, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") created a national team of experts to
analyze the ramifications of cash balance plans upon older
workers. In announcing the National Cash Balance Pension
Team, EEOC Chairwoman Ida L. Castro stated that:
Whether or not Cash Balance Pension Plans discriminate against
employees covered by the ADEA is a question that I am determined
to explore fully. The complexity of the issue, which partly stems
from the variety of ways these pension plans evolve and are
formulated, necessitates our drawing upon the best expertise within
EEOC to make determinations about their compliance with
provisions of the ADEA.251
Furthermore, the team is instructed to collaborate with
various groups such as the Departments of Treasury and Labor, as
well as gather feedback from employers, employees, labor groups
252
and civil rights groups.

248. http://www.pbgc.gov (last visited on Oct. 4, 2003).
249. Title IV Aspects of Cash Balance Plans with Variable Indices, 65 Fed.
Reg. 41610-12 (July 6, 2000).
250. 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
251. Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Sept. 20,
1999) available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/9-20-99.html. Under Title III of

ERISA, as amended through executive orders, the only government agencies
with authority to regulate the provisions of ERISA are the Departments of
Labor and Treasury. However, since there are alleged age discrimination
issues with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, then the EEOC, which
has authority to regulate the provisions of the ADEA, can potentially affect
the viability of the cash balance plan design.
252. Search of the EEOC website on October 1, 2003 and March 4, 2004
indicate no reporting of any activity by this team, and only shows the news
release establishing the team.
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E.

What is the FinancialAccounting StandardsBoard'sposition?

The Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") has
recently decided to add a limited scope project to its agenda that
will address the issue of cash balance plans. 253 Presently, there is
not any accounting guidance for how public companies are
supposed to report their cash balance plan obligations and costs on
their income statements and balance sheets. FASB is hoping that
the result of this project will actually help define a cash balance
254
plan.
F.

What is the Congressionalposition?

Bills have been introduced to protect employees in
conversions and which would render the proposed Treasury
Regulations inapplicable. The main piece of legislation to protect
employees in a cash balance plan conversion is the Pension
Benefits Protection Act of 2003 introduced in both the House of
Representatives 255 and in the Senate. 256 There are two general
components of the Pension Benefits Protection Act of 2003 that
regard cash balance plans. The first is the requirement that
companies that convert to a cash balance plan must allow workers
who are at least forty years old or have at least ten years of service
to be given the choice of remaining in their current defined benefit
plan design. As stated by Bernie Sanders, Representative of
Vermont, "the employees cannot be forced into an inferior plan
when a company makes a promise to its employees regarding their
pension benefits, it must not be able to pull the rug out from under
257
its employees by cutting their pension benefits in midstream."
The second component of the proposed legislation will eliminate
the Bush Administration's proposed cash balance pension plan
Treasury
Regulations,
which
are
viewed
as allowing
discrimination against older employees. Most likely these bills
will never pass due to the Bush Administration's strong position
on the matter; and former White House Press Secretary Ari
Fleischer has even labeled the idea that cash balance plans hurt
older workers as "not valid." 258 Additionally, referring to the
253. Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB Adds Project on
Measurement of "Cash-Balance" Defined Pension Plan Obligations at
http://www.fasb.org/pensions_9-25-03.shtml (last visited Mar. 4, 2004).
254. Id.
255. Pension Benefit Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 1677, 108th Cong. (2003)
256. Pension Benefit Protection Act of 2003, S.825, 108th Cong. (2003).
257. Statement of Congressman Sanders on Apr. 8, 2003 regarding: The
Pension
Benefits
Protection
Act
available
at
http:/Ibernie.house.gov/statements/
20030408190049.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2004).

258. White House Press Briefing, Ari Fleischer, White House Press
Secretary in Washington,
D.C.
(Dec.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/

10,

2002)

available

at
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Treasury Department's, proposed regulations, Fleischer stated,
"under these rules, the plan must be age neutral before
the
conversion, age neutral after the conversion, [and] age neutral in
the process of the conversion." 25 9 The latest action taken by
Congress was the amendment by the House to an appropriations
bil260 that would prohibit the Treasury from using funds to assist
in the overturning of a recent district court case that held that all
cash balance plans, by design, violate the age discrimination rules
261
of ERISA.
VI. IS THE CASH BALANCE PLAN PART OF THE DEFINED
BENEFIT PLAN RENAISSANCE?

Up to this point, there has been a lot of negative press and, in
the author's opinion, misunderstandings and confusion over cash
balance plans. However, a string of recent legislative amendments
and agency guidance, all indicate that public policy favors the
renaissance and revitalization of the use of defined benefit plans
in a company's overall retirement program. The author suggests
that the future defined benefit plan universe will be comprised
mostly by cash balance or other hybrid designs, and unless
Congress steps in and allows cash balance plan designs to be
accepted, and even encouraged, under their own statutory
definition and rules, then there will likely be a total defined
benefit extinction rather than a renaissance. The current issues
being litigated have been discussed; and if there is a combination
of statutory and regulatory changes that solve the issues and allow
cash balance plan designs to easily comply with all existing
qualified plan rules, and any potential provisions relating only to
cash balance plans, then the future of cash balance plans should
be quite beneficial for many employers and employees alike.

2002/12/20021210-11.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2004).
259. Id.
260. Amendment A025 to House Bill H.R. 2989, The Transportation,
Treasury, and Independent Agencies AppropriationAct of 2004, 108th Cong.,

1st Sess., introduced Sept. 9, 2003 by Rep. Sanders. However, Congress asked
the Secretary of Treasury to propose legislation, and in the President's budget
proposal released on February 2, 2004, legislation was proposed with three
basic goals: (1) to clarify the legality of cash balance plans; (2) to assure
fairness to older workers after a conversion with a transition period of
protection (such as five years); And (3) to remove the cap on market interest

rate credits (which, in mitigating the whipsaw problem, would likely render
certain aspects of Notice 96-8 irrelevant). The press release is available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/pressl
releases/jsl132.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
261. CCH Inc., Pension and Benefits News, Pension and Benefits News,
Sept. 17, 2003.
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A. How has the media viewed cash balanceplans so far?
Among other things, many overfunded defined benefit plans
were being converted in the 1990's, and the results of the
conversions boosted their financial statements and their earnings
per share. As mentioned earlier, the accounting changes that
FASB is looking into could change how future conversions are
reported on the financial statements. The most likely event is that
if new accounting rules are created, these rules will cause
companies to report higher pension liabilities on their books.
"Some companies' pension obligations stood to increase about 20%
if changes were adopted. An increase in pension obligations can
indirectly reduce profit." 262 Other problems are that "a sharp
increase in pension liabilities could also disrupt a company's
ability to borrow money. Furthermore, as this stuff gets onto
balance sheets, it starts triggering certain things. A company's
creditors can call in the debt, or change the provisions so the
company suddenly has to pay a higher interest rate."263 Such a
result could cause a sharp decline in companies' willingness to
convert their traditional defined benefit plans into cash balance
plans.
Aside from the negative attention paid to the
improvements to a company's financial status after a conversion,
there has also been a lot of negative press about the alleged age
264
discrimination violations of the conversions.
B.

What is the defined benefit plan renaissance?

This article is proposing that there is a defined benefit
renaissance underway, or at the very least, the factors are in place
to help foster such a revitalization of such plans. This necessarily
means that defined benefit plans used to be the favored plan, that
there was a period of decline, and that there should currently be a
growing number of defined benefit plans. Arguably, traditional
defined benefit plans that were converted into cash balance plans
rather than being terminated bolster the number of current
defined benefit plans. In addition, many new cash balance plans
have been established by employers that were not, at the time of
adoption, sponsoring defined benefit plans. Therefore, if cash
balance plans are not wholly accepted as good plans, and if there
continues to be litigation, bad press and Congressional doubt as to
the design itself, then there will likely be an extinction of all
262. Mary Williams Walsh, Changes Discussed in Accounting for Pension
Fund Obligations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003, at C1.

263. Id.
264. For a good sampling of the negative press, especially since Cooper v.

IBM was decided, go to the ERISA Blog section of the website for the Law
Offices
of
B.
Janell
Grenier,
Esq.
at
http://www.benefitscounsel.com/erisaarchive/000430.html (last visited Mar. 4,
2004).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[37:753

defined benefit plans rather than a rejuvenation. First, we need to
see how traditional defined benefit plans fit into the picture when
ERISA was first enacted.
ERISA was enacted in 1974, in a vastly different business
environment. The defined benefit plan was the predominant plan,
as indicated by the following two observations:
ERISA was a product of its time. It was based on the assumption
that defined benefit plans would be the mainstay of the pension
system. It emphasized replacement ratios rather than account
balances, as a measure of pension adequacy. The long-term viability
of such plans, which contain an inherent age bias, was not
questioned, even though the baby boom was just then entering
adulthood and the demographic significance of such a large cohort
was well recognized. Nor did ERISA's proponents consider how
plans should evolve if life expectancies increased and the demand
265
for labor changed.
ERISA was forged 30 years ago, addressing the issues that seemed
of paramount importance in the early 1970s. Reacting in significant
part to the collapse of Studebaker and the ensuing financial ruin
brought to the thousands of the company's employees and retirees,
ERISA sought to create a comprehensive framework that would
ensure that future employers would be forced to live up to their
pension promises.

...

These rules, although they applied in

differing degrees to all retirement plans, were most closely attuned
to the defined benefit plan structure, the dominant plan of the era,
266
and the one covering the greatest number of employees.
So, the defined benefit plan seems to have been the main type
of

qualified

plan

at

the

time

Congress

enacted

ERISA.2 67

However, statistics demonstrate that for various reasons, they
have lost favor with employers and employees alike. 268

But the

promotion of defined benefit pension plans is on the upswing. In
1998, the PBGC indicated that they are turning their attention to
the first part of their mission statement: "to encourage the
continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pensions for
the benefit of their participants. '269 Former President Clinton's
265. Pamela Perun & C. Eugene Steuerle, ERISA at 50: A New Model for the

Private Pension System, Occasional Paper Number 4 for the Retirement
Project of the Urban Institute at 2 (Mar. 2000) available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadPDF/retire_4.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2004).
266. Scott Macey & Gretchen Young, The Future of Employee Benefits: A
Call for Reform, 15 BENEFITS LAW JOURNAL 5, 7-8 (2002).
267. Douglas Fore, Do We have a Retirement Crisis in America?, TIAA-CRED

Institute Research Dialogue, 2003.
268. For statistics, see Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Employee Participation in Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans,
1985-2000, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20030325tb01.htm
(last visited Mar. 4, 2004).

269. Nell Hennessy, Deputy Executive Director and Chief Negotiator of the
PBGC, Remarks at the Meeting of the WEB Network of Benefits Professionals

Cash BalancePlan

2004]

and Vice President Gore's "interest in defined benefit plans is
simply indicative of the interest we are beginning tto see from
other Baby Boomers as we get closer to traditional retirement
ages." 270 In her concluding remarks, Ms. Hennessy stated:
as benefits professionals, you are well aware of the important role
that a defined benefit plan plays in a well-rounded employee
benefits package. Hopefully we can work together to educate
workers and employers so that, over the next ten to fifteen years, we
can make meaningful pensions a reality for more American
workers.

271

Many accounts in 401(k) plans and other defined contribution
plans have eroded in the last few years due to the current
economic environment. 272 That, in conjunction with the following
statutory changes favorable to defined benefit plans, set the stage
for a defined benefit plan renaissance over the next few years.
1. Effective in 2000, the combined plan limitations have been
repealed. 273 Before repeal, if an employer maintained both a
defined benefit and a defined contribution plan, and an
employee participated in both, then he or she was barred from
receiving the maximum benefit from the defined benefit plan
and the maximum allocation in the defined contribution plan,
assuming compensation was high enough to warrant this level
of contributions.
Due to the method of calculating the
combined plan limits, many affected participants received the
maximum defined contribution allocation and thus received a
reduced benefit from the defined benefit plans. After the
repeal, such participants can now receive the maximum
benefit from the defined benefit plan as well.
2. Effective in 1997, Congress eliminated the penalty tax on
excess distributions. 274 Before the repeal, participants in a
defined benefit plan would pay a 15% penalty tax if they died
and their remaining benefits in the defined benefit plan were
"excessive." This proved to be a disincentive for participants to
accumulate large benefits in a qualified plan. After the repeal,
no participant needs to be concerned with "excessive"
accumulations upon death.
3. Effective in 2002, the maximum limit on benefits from defined
(Feb. 19, 1998), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/news/speeches/web.htm (last
visited Mar. 4, 2004).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. William Bernstein, Riding for a Fall: The 401(k) is Likely to Turn out to
be a Defined-Chaos Retirement Plan,BARRON'S, Nov. 26, 2001.
273. I.R.C. § 415(e) (1994), repealed by the Small Business Job Protection
Act of 1996.
274. I.R.C. § 4980A (1994), temporarily repealed by the Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996, then permanently repealed by the Taxpayer Relief Act
of 1997.
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benefit plans is increased to $160,000 per year payable at age
sixty-two. 275 Before the amendment, the maximum limit was
$90,000 (as adjusted) per year payable at the participant's
social security retirement age (sixty-five, sixty-six, or sixtyseven, depending on year of birth). After the amendment,
participants in a defined benefit plan can receive greater
benefits (as long as the employer can properly fund for them).
4. Finally, the IRS over the years has clarified the
nondiscrimination rules that apply to defined benefit plans,
especially with the addition of the cross-testing rules as part of
276
the 1993 final regulations.
C. Why is a cash balance plan design integral to fuel the
renaissance?
Cash balance plans meet the needs of employers with mobile
work forces. Through a cash balance plan, employers can offer
significant benefits to employees that are only there for a short
period of time. As they leave, their cash balance accounts are
portable, and can easily be rolled over into an IRA or transferred
Because of the cross-testing
into another qualified plan.
provisions, the deferral opportunity is flexible. Additionally, if the
employer is a partnership, then the allocation of the plan
contribution among the partners can simply be his or her
allocation for the year, plus or minus the proportionate cost for
non-partner participants and a proportionate share of gains or
losses.
Statistically, cash balance plans are quite prominent 277: 40%
of all defined benefit plan assets are in cash balance plan trusts;
25% of all defined benefit plan participants are in cash balance
plans; 33% of the Fortune 100 companies sponsor cash balance
plans; and 19% of the 1000 largest U.S. companies sponsor cash
balance plans. Additionally, over 300 defined benefit plans have
been converted into cash balance plans, but are awaiting IRS
determination letters. 278 All in all, public policy demands that
Congress and the executive agencies find solutions that encourage
employers to establish new cash balance plans or convert their
existing defined benefit plans into cash balance plans. As noted by
a former Benefits Tax Counsel at the Department of Treasury,
275. I.R.C. § 415(b), as amended by the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001.
276. Treas. Reg. § 1.40(a)(4)-8 (2000).
277. See Stephen Taub, Cash-Balance Plans Hang in the Balance, Aug. 5,
2003, available at http://www.cfo.com/article/1,5309.10351//A/776/.00.html
(last visited Mar. 4, 2004).
278. See Rep. Bernie Sanders, member of Congress, letter to Arthur Levitt,
Jr., Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission, dated January 6, 2000,
available at http://www.house.gov/bernie/publications/letters/2001-01-06-secibm.html (discussing the IBM conversion and its affect on shareholders).
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[t]he overall defined benefit system would benefit considerably from
a resolution of the cash balance controversy that would settle the
law governing those plans in a reasonable way.... I believed
Congress could resolve the cash balance controversy in a manner
that reasonably protects older workers from the adverse effects of a
conversion while allowing employers reasonable flexibility to change
2 79
their plans.
VII. CONCLUSION

Tax qualified retirement plans fall into two categories:
defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans. For various
reasons, defined benefit plans have, over the years, become less
favorable for employers than defined contribution plans. Some of
the reasons include higher annual administrative costs, rigid
funding requirements during economic down turns, and the
perceived lack of understanding of defined benefit promises by
younger and shorter-serviced employees. However, during this
same general period, Congress has amended ERISA and The Code
to make defined benefit plans more attractive. Some examples are
the elimination of the combined plan limits and the increased
dollar limit that can be paid from a plan. These statutory changes,
as well as the depressed economy that makes defined contribution
plans (especially 401(k) plans) less attractive, are some of the basic
reasons that a defined benefit plan renaissance is set to begin.
Since there are a substantial number of existing cash balance
plans, whether through conversion or not, the cash balance design
itself is responsible for at least the defined benefit plan
preservation, if not for the renaissance. However, for cash balance
plans to help foster the renaissance that is suggested, all of the
ambiguity over their designs must be resolved. This author hopes
that either Congress will amend ERISA and the Code to provide a
definition and a statutory framework from which cash balance
plans can comply with the qualified plan rules, or they should
adopt the legislative proposals suggested by the Department of
Treasury. Otherwise, the one class of qualified plans that provides
pension security, i.e. defined benefit plans, will fade into the
history books.
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